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The authors are greatly indebted to those individuals so
chronically busy participating in the budget process who willingly




On July 12, 1974, the President of the United States signed into law
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 19 74 (Public Law
93-344) . Embodied in this law are budget reforms prompted primarily by a
widespread concern that the. national legislature should participate more
fully with the Executive Branch of government at every step in the
determination of revenues and the expenditure of public monies. Thus,
Congress seeks through this Act to reassert itself as a more effective
partner with the Executive Branch in managing the Nation's finances and
economy.
On the basis of the Constitution and traditional legislative pre-
rogatives, Congress claimed exclusive control over the purse through the
taxation, authorization and appropriation processes. However, in the
past fifty years, this power was exercised through piecemeal responses to
a budget prepared and submitted by the Executive Department. This
fragmented approach led to a steady erosion of Congress' constitutional
power of the purse and consequently handicapped its ability to effectively
discharge its responsibilities in reviewing the Federal budget. Concern
regarding ineffective Congressional budget control reached a peak in 19 72
when President Nixon stated:
The present Congressional system of independent,
unrelated actions on various spending programs means
that the Congress arrives at total Federal spending
in an accidental, haphazard manner. That is no
longer good enough procedure for the American people
. . . [Ref. 71].
This challenge by Nixon may be interpreted as providing impetus for
the Legislative Branch to handle one of its most basic responsibilities
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under the Constitution - the power of the purse. Ultimately, the role
of Congress in our system of government was also at stake [Ref.33, p. 48],
Thus, two major forces were behind the 1974 Congressional budget
reform effort: one was Congress' self-recognized need to correct
deficiencies in the existing budgetary process and act with fiscal
responsibility; the other was its need to confront presidential dominance
and reassert its own priorities and prerogatives in the Federal budget
process. Underlying both of these forces, was a growing concern for the
state of the Nation's economy and a realization that the United States'
resources were becoming scarce [Ref. 42, p. 1].
The stated purposes of the Act are: the Congress declares that it
is essential —
(1) to assure effective Congressional control over the budgetary
process;
(2) to provide for the Congressional determination each year of the
appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures;
(3) to provide a system of impoundment control;
(4) to establish national budget priorities; and
(5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the executive
branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in discharging its
duties.
It does not eliminate the existing authorizing and appropriating pro-
cedures, but establishes new supplementary budget review processes which




allow Congress to determine national budget policies and priorities.
2
The Act also establishes procedures for legislative review of impoundments
proposed by the President. As the major feature of this budget reform,
the new process provides a framework for Congress to make mathematically
3
consistent annual decisions about total Federal budget authority,
expenditures (outlays), revenues, public debt levels and budget surplus
or deficit. Most importantly, this initial budget review by the entire
membership of Congress reconciles annual revenues with total annual
spending and results in a joint Congressional budget resolution. These
fiscal guidelines can then serve to restrain Congress as it proceeds with
its customary decisions regarding annual appropriations and other spending
authority for each Federal program.
To assist Congress in meeting these new responsibilities, the Act
authorizes House and Senate Budget Committees (HBC and SBC) and a
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) . The Budget Committees review all
proposals for Federal spending, formulate recommendations in regard to the
tentative and final Congressional budgets and prepare concurrent
resolutions on the budget. The CBO provides an analytical capability to
assist the committees of Congress, especially the Budget Committees. The
2
Executive action, or inaction, that prevents the obligation and
expenditure of funds previously authorized and appropriated by Congress.
3
Authority provided by law to enter into obligations which will
result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds, except
that such term does not include authority to insure or guarantee the
repayment of indebtedness incurred by another person or government.
14

CBO will monitor the economy, estimate the impacts of proposals for new
budget authority, analyze the costs and effects of alternative budget
choices and improve the flow and quality of budget information. The
Act also requires adherence to a rigid timetable for carrying out each
major step in the Congressional budget process and changes the Federal
fiscal year to begin 1 October rather than 1 July. To further help
Congress, additional data is to be submitted in the President's January
budget (e.g., estimated and actual revenues for the last completed fiscal
year, itemization of tax expenditures, five-year budget projections,
etc.); requests for the authorization of new budget authority are to be
submitted one year in advance; and the President will submit a current
4
services budget by 10 November of each year.
The Act's budget reforms represent the most important change to
take place in the legislative budget process since enactment of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. These reforms will have an impact on
Congressional budget review and decision making processes and consequently
will alter budgetary initiatives of the Executive Department. This thesis
will assess this impact by providing an historic insight: into the Act and
by analyzing the structural aspects of the new process, with particular
emphasis on the realities of Congressional budget reforms. Its primary
contribution will be an overview of a new, evolving process which will
serve as a basis for further research in this area of general interest.
Estimated expenditures and proposed budget authority which would be
included in the President's budget for the ensuing fiscal year if all
programs and activities were carried on at the same level as the fiscal
year in progress (base year-FY76) and without policy changes. The pur-
poses of the current services budget, are to give Congress an earl)7, start
on its budget work and to provide I:baseline" information against which
the President's budget and alternatives can be compared.
15

In discussing the Act's various provisions and implications, a
basic understanding of the legislative budget review process prior to
the 1974 reform is assumed. To expand this knowledge base, Chapter II
provides additional background concerning the past deficiencies of the
legislative budgetary process and poses several pertinent issues or
questions for consideration in proceeding to study and assess the Act's
probable impacts. Chapter III briefly discusses the research design. In
Chapter IV, the Act will be examined from three different perspectives.
The first section provides a brief historical setting of events leading
up to enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974. The second section develops a title-by-title descriptive
analysis of the Act's provisions. In this regard, the Act's legal
structure is employed for two reasons: to provide the reader with a
basic explanation of the Act, and to provide a logical framework for
presenting and discussing the authors' findings. The final section
provides a functional analysis and recapitulation of the Act's provisions
and outlines several issues and potential problems which pervade the
legislative budget reform effort. Throughout, particular emphasis will
be given to aspects which have potential impacts for the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Navy. Chapter V summarizes the findings, draws
conclusions and offers suggestions for further research.
16

II. DEFINITION OF PROBLEM
A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REFORM INITIATIVES
In any given year, the Federal budget is the most important single
expression of the United States government's priorities. Yet, until
recently, Congress had no way of viewing or examining the aggregate
budget. It had no means of setting budget priorities; no means of
coordinating expenditures and revenues; in short, Congress addressed the
Federal budget in a fragmented manner - lacking any type of wholistic
rationale. Representative Charles E. Bennett (D-Fla) described these
Congressional budget process deficiencies rather pointedly:
Congress, as now operating, can be compared to a
poorly run corporation. There are 500 men on the
board of directors, a board that won't pass on the
corporation's annual budget. It has no overall
mastery of the total budget and no real list of
priorities
.
Only a handful of the Members really understand
the issues behind the separate budgets; so,
trusting their specializing colleagues, they vote
in favor of measure after measure largely on the
basis of whether the programs appear good rather
than on whether they are good and can be afforded.
It seems amazing that the Federal Government's
legislative branch, handling the biggest budget in
the world, has so poor a grip on the fiscal process
[Ref. 66, PT.l, p. 118].
The reasons for budget reform are varied, and many are deep-rooted
in the rapid and complex growth of the United States itself. Mr. George
Gross, General Counsel, House Committee on the Budget, mentioned four
possible causes in his general explanation of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
17

First, the size of the Federal budget has grown immensely in the
last fifty years, with the debt alone rising from $1 billion to $500
billion. Additionally, he noted that the budget has now become a
principal tool used to determine governmental goals and economic growth.
Second, earlier efforts at budget reform merely enhanced and
centralized budgetary authority within the Executive Branch, while allow-
ing further fragmentation within Congress.
The third cause Mr. Gross cited is the very nature and timing of
Congressional budget actions. For example, "back-door spending"
accounts for 56 percent of all spending; over 75 percent of the budget
is relatively uncontrollable and growing rapidly; little coordination
exists between Congressional budget actions and Executive Branch
expenditures for any given year; and the necessity for many Federal
agencies to operate under continuing resolutions until such time as new
fiscal year appropriation bills can be approved.
Finally, he concluded that the increased use of impoundments by the
Executive Branch had weakened Congress' constitutional power to establish
spending priorities [Ref. 23, p. 1-2].
Thus, over the years, Congress had developed feelings of frustration
and subordination in attempting to grapple with the budget determination
capacity of the Executive Branch. In short, Congress had, in its own
eyes, lost the power of the purse to the Executive Branch. The Congres-
The authorized expenditure of funds outside of or prior to the
appropriations process.
Expenditures are considered relatively uncontrollable in any one
year when legislative decisions in that year can neither increase nor
decrease them without changing existing substantive law.
18

sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 19 74 was formulated and
enacted to provide the necessary means for Congress to reassert itself
and regain control over an ever increasingly complex budgetary process.
Senators and Representatives of both parties praised enactment of
the new bill. Senator Charles H. Percy (R-Ill) noted:
The budget reform legislation represents one of those
historic turning points in the evolution of our
institution, a reversal of the accelerating erosion
of the congressional power of the purse > a reassertion
of our correct role in the American plan of government
[Ref. 24, p. 734].
Senator Sara J. Ervin, Jr. (D-NC) stated "this is one of the most important
pieces of legislation that Congress has considered since the First
Congress " [Ref. 25].
Although the Act was overwhelmingly supported by Congress, the new
budget process does represent a departure from the past. Congress must
transform their process of enacting the Federal budget from a piecemeal
approach into a rational, systematic approach. Accordingly, like anything
new and as potentially vital as the new Act might be, there are many
significant issues and questions which should be examined before the final
impacts become discernible.
B. PERTINENT ISSUES AND QUESTIONS
1 . Catalysts of Budget Reform
What really prompted enactment" of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 19 74? It has long been recognized that the
Congressional budgetary process was deficient in many ways, but why was
a law enacted at this particular point in the history of the United




Past Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Smith, has
written:
The relationship between the Legislative and the
Executive Branches largely determines the success or
failure of democratic government. Hence the budget,
because it is at the same time the most important
instrument of legislative control and of executive
management, is at the very core of democratic
government [Ref. 54].
Major revisions in the Federal budgetary process can be expected
to alter traditional Executive-Legislative relationships; and, in a more
fundamental sense, effect the processes and outcomes of democratic
government [Ref. 9, p. 7]. What will be the implications and realities
of these changing relationships? Will the President willingly permit
Congress to usurp some of his initiative and dominance in shaping the
Federal budget? Since the budget expresses and embodies the objectives
of his Administration, should a president reasonably be expected to
provide Congress advance budget estimates and projections which might
divulge his future plans and therefore restrict his future decision
alternatives or fiscal options?
3. Intra-Congressional Conflicts
With the formation of the two new Budget Committees, initial
struggles could develop within the Congress as committees and members
discover new roles and vie for power. What will be the relationships of
the HBC and the SBC with each other and with other Congressional
committees? What new alliances and coalitions will develop?
Samuel M. Cohn, a former Assistant Director of the Office of
Management, and Budget (OMB), was recently quoted as saying, "There's a
potential conflict between the Budget Committees and every committee on
20

the Hill " [Ref. 7, p. 2417]. With each Congressional committee and
subcommittee looking out for Federal programs within its jurisdiction,
the Budget Committees will undoubtedly encounter resistance when
recommending budget priorities and limits. How will these new committees
cope with and effect Congress' existing power structure?
4. Congressional Decision Making Process
The Act now gives Congress a mechanism to match the budget
determination capabilities of the Executive Branch. Can this new budget
process be effectively employed by an institution in which authority is
fragmented by design? Can a body without a chief executive, a body of
members with substantially equal powers and varied constituencies, and a
body of powerful and competing committees discipline itself to play a
role comparable to that of the Executive Branch in the Federal budgeting
process? [Ref. 35, p. 48-49]. Can such a body traditionally concerned
with details and given to specialization simultaneously
generalize and synthesize an integrated Federal budget?
5. Improved Budgetary Information
Congress, previously, has lacked its own budget analysis
capability and has had to rely on budgetary information provided by
Executive Department agencies. Realizing that good information is a
necessity for exercising its constitutional responsibilities, Congress
has corrected this deficiency by creating its new analytical arm, the
CBO.
Can the CBO support the informational and analytical requirements
of Congress? Will the CBO be able to remain neutral and avoid advocacy?
21

6. Setting National Priorities
One of the declared purposes of the Act is to establish
national budget priorities. Exactly who will establish these priorities,
and what criteria will be utilized in establishing them?
7. Timetable and Timing
In assuming more responsibility, Congress has created more
work for itself. More work means more time. Accordingly, Congress has
adopted a rigid and intricate timetable for its work. How will Congress
react now that it must meet deadlines which it has set for itself? Some
believe that the timetable and the procedures are so complicated that
Congress will either ignore them or fail miserably in meeting their
deadlines.
8. Success or Failure
The Federal budget process is a highly complicated business.
Sensitive to past budget reform failures, the Congress is now resolved
to exercise powers which have laid dormant for years. Even if Congress
survives internal stresses and performs as the Act intends, can they cope
with the rest of the bureaucracy? Ironically, the Budget Committees and
the CBO represent yet another layer of bureaucracy to be dealt with in
the Federal budget process. Can Congress, as a political institution
designed to operate incrementally, discipline itself enough to make the
Act work? If the process is found to be unworkable in its present form,




9. Implications and Problems for POD and Navy
The implications and possible problems for DOD and the Navy
could be extensive. Despite national security threats or the prevailing
defense sentiments (pro or con) of Congress, approximately 65 percent of
DOD's budget is largely controllable and subject to annual review. By
comparison, this portion represents approximately 18 percent of the total
Federal budget or a sizeable share (about 70 percent) of the entire
controllable amount (25 percent). In short, DOD has a lot at stake. Will
the new process subject the defense budget to closer scrutiny and/or
debilitating reductions? Can DOD be expected to provide more detailed
or additional budget submission data? Will Congressional budget analyses
probe more deeply into internal DOD program/budget review and decision
making processes? Will Congress now require greater access to defense
intelligence estimates and threat assessments as it reviews the DOD
budget request? What will be the nature of the Budget Committees' defense
issue hearings?
C. INTENT OF STUDY
In light of these all-pervasive issues, it is important that the
realities and implications of the new Congressional Budget Control Act be
analyzed and understood. The authors intend to investigate the issues
outlined above and discuss how the new budget process will in fact operate,
The primary thrust of the research will involve a study of the new
Approximately 75 percent of the Federal budget is considered
relatively uncontrollable under existing law, and the uncontrollables
represent the fastest rising part of the total budget [Kef. 23, p. 2].
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Congressional budget procedure, its organizational structure, and newly
established bodies - specifically, the CBO and the staffs of both the
House and the Senate Budget Committees. The objective is to provide
insight into the interworkings of these Congressional bodies and through
personal interviews and observations ascertain the basic philosophies of
those staff members intimately involved in the Congressional budget
process. In this manner, it is hoped to underscore the importance of
this new Act and offer insights and assessments which will aid DOD and




III. DESIGN OF INVESTIGATION
A. RESEARCH DESIGN SUMMARY
The area chosen for study was decidedly large, complex and new.
Since there was little written information available beyond basic general
explanations of the Act's legal provisions, the authors concluded that
necessary information and insights could be obtained only from those
individuals intimately involved and familiar with the Act. Consequently,
the basic research methodology chosen was to conduct semi-structured
interviews with selected persons involved in the new Congressional
budget process. The major input to the thesis came from ten days (2-13
September 19 75) of research and interviews in the Washington, D.C. area.
For the most part, Congressional committee interviews were limited to
senior staff members. A more detailed outline of the research effort is
contained in Appendix A.
B. RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS
The budget process is a very central and important function of the
Federal government that involves or influences many individuals. Although
the interview sample was selective, it was small (n = 35). Also, the
investigation was limited primarily to those individuals specifically
involved in analyzing or processing the defense segment of the budget.
Consequently, no claim is made for the representativeness of the interview
sample or the specific time span. All interviews are to some degree
time-bound, and the leader should remain sensitive to the problem of
generalizing froii^ information obtained in such a manner. A different
group of respondents or choice of timing probably would have resulted in
25

somewhat different answers and perceptions. Due to the vastness of the
subject area and research time constraints, this effort is not intended
to be a comprehensive or definitive study of the Congressional budget
process
.
Insights gained in this manner are hard to document, and such
procedures seem relatively unscientific, subjective and open to the
interpretations and biases of the interviewers. While the shortcomings
of this technique are recognized, the less rigorous interview method has
been profitably employed in past studies of this type [Refs. 2, 15, 16,
31 and 73]. Results obtained from studies of this nature most often
depend on variables which are difficult, if not impossible, to control
or quantify. Accordingly, it becomes the responsibility of the research-
ers to act as a filter and to select for presentation those items
considered most relevant. The intent of the presentation is to incorporate
and integrate the personal perceptions and insights obtained through
interviewing with previously documented information. The reader is
requested, therefore, to indulge the judgmental and literary license of
the authors.
Anonymity was either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed to each
respondent. Thus, in documenting evidence, the authors were unable to
directly attribute the findings to anyone specifically.
26

IV. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
A. HISTORICAL SETTING
1. Past Reform Efforts
In reforming its budget procedures, Congress has undertaken an
effort embarked on and abandoned nearly 25 years ago. In the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, Congress provided for the adoption of a
legislative budget to be drawn up each year by the members of the four
revenue and appropriations committees [Ref. 16, p. 122].
Similar in some respects to the 1974 Act, the 1946 Act required
that Congress set by concurrent resolution a maximum amount to be
appropriated for each fiscal year. That appropriations ceiling was part
of a legislative budget based on revenue and spending estimates prepared
by a Joint Budget Committee which was made up of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and of the tax-writing House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees [Ref. 16, p. 629].
In 1947, conferees failed to agree on Senate amendments to the
budget resolution. In 1948, the resolution was approved by both chambers,
but Congress appropriated $6 billion more than its own legislative budget
ceiling. In 1949, the legislative budget never was produced, and Congress
abandoned that section of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
which had inaugurated the scheme [Ref. 26, p. 397].
After failure of the legislative budget, Congress in 1950
enacted an omnibus appropriations bill wrapping all appropriation requests




In 1952 and many times again in subsequent years, the Senate
passed a bill creating a Joint Committee on the Budget. The House,
however, did not take similar action, thereby forestalling any reform.
2. The Nixon Administration
Thus, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 had its origin in this background of reform attempts, but it was
the Nixon Administration and in particular President Nixon himself who
provided the real catalyst. There were a number of things that President
Nixon did which precipitated Congress 1 action.
In his book, The Imperial Presidency , Arthur Schlesinger argued
that the Administration was marked by a breakdown of comity between
Nixon and the Congress. The concept of comity is at best nebulous, but
according to James P. Pfiffner, it is meant to "connote a degree of
restraint in interbranch relations that allows informal norms to keep
disputes from getting out of hand" [Ref. 42, p. 8]. Comity implies a
degree of friendly civility which apparently was lacking under Nixon's
leadership. President Nixon's attitude of confrontation vice
accommodation towards Congress has been well documented. Pfiffner cites
the special use of the pocket veto [Ref. 46] and the attempted dis-
mantling of the Office of Economic Opportunity [Ref. 58] as examples
contributing to the breakdown of comity between the Nixon Presidency
and Congress.
While the general breakdown in comity provided a backdrop for
the deteriorating Executive/Congressional relationships, there was also
a specific clash between President Nixon and the Congress over fiscal
priorities and budgetary power. The unprecedented manner in which
President Nixon impounded funds only served to exacerbate an already
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tense situation. Using impoundment procedures as a weapon, he continually
undermined Congressional fiscal priorities. Nixon even went so far as to
claim that he had the constitutional power to impound funds [Ref. 20].
There were a number of attempts by Congress to curb the Nixon
impoundments. There were six bills introduced in the 92nd Congress
requiring the President to notify Congress when he impounded funds [Ref.
67, p. 171]. At least 18 bills were introduced in the 93rd Congress to
limit presidential impoundment control [Ref. 67, p. 173-174]. In May
19 73, Congress again attempted to make the President more accountable
when it passed a bill to require confirmation by the Senate of the
Director and the Deputy Director of 0MB [Ref. 8].
Thus, the tensions which existed between the Presidency and
Congress were not only a result of Nixon's leadership style, but also the
very real institutional threat he posed. The escalation of Nixon's
impoundment actions and the formal powers of 0MB presented Congress with
a very serious threat to its power of the purse [Ref. 42, p. 16]. It
was in this environment that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 19 74 was formulated.
_
3 . Final Enactment
A month before the 19 72 Presidential election and during
consideration of legislation to raise the ceiling on the public debt,
President Nixon challenged Congress to pass a law placing a $250 billion
ceiling on the Fiscal J973 budget. Although both chambers adopted the
requested limit on spending, they ultimately were unable to agree on
what discretion the President should be given to enforce the ceiling.
The ceiling was later eliminated by the House—Senate Conferees. However,
embedded in this 1972 debt limit legislation (P.L. 92-599), Congress
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initiated action to remedy the very problem that made it so difficult
to cut the budget. It established a Joint Study Committee on Budget
Control and directed it to study:
. . . the procedures which should be adopted by the
Congress for the purpose of improving Congressional
control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals, in-
cluding procedures for establishing and maintaining
an overall view of each year's budgetary outlays
which is fully coordinated with an overall view of
the anticipated revenues for that year [Ref. 62,
p. 17].
The Joint Study Committee unanimously recommended new Congress-
ional procedures for dealing with the budget in its final report issued
in April 19 73. Despite significant modifications in the details of
budget reform as the study recommendations circulated through the House
and the Senate, committee votes were unanimous at every step. The House
approved its budget reform bill (HR 7130) by a vote of 386-23, and the
Senate version (S 1541) was approved 80-0. Although the House and the
Senate bills differed substantially in detail, the overwhelming support
clearly indicated the members' common belief that the need for budget
reform was far greater than their disagreements over the details of how
to achieve it. One important area of dispute was settled in a major
conference compromise, when the conferees devised hybrid impoundment
control procedures designed to protect the Congressional budget decisions
from being overruled by a President who refused to spend appropriated
funds. Final action in both Houses was completed in June 1974, and the




The new Act has two real purposes: (1) to restore to Congress
its fiscal responsibility under the Constitution; that is, the power of
the purse, and (2) to improve the Congressional budget making process.
Virtually every facet of the new Act can be matched with a perceived
shortcoming in the earlier process. The impoundment control stems from
the large scale withholding of funds under President Nixon; the two
Budget Committees derive from the lack of a Congressional means to
coordinate tax and spending policies; the Congressional Budget Office
from Congressional dependence on the Executive agencies for essential
budget data; and the budget resolutions from the absence of any single
coherent procedure to determine overall budget totals and priorities.
If the new procedures associated with the Act fail, it will not
be for lack of interest in Congress. Although Republicans were a little
more restrained than fellow Democrats, both were effusive in their praise
of the new legislation. Unfortunately, it will take more than enthusiasm
to make the new budget procedures work properly. Unreal as it may seem,
many members of Congress are not familiar with the way the Federal budget
operates. However, as one House staff aide put it, "No matter what
happens, it's got to be an improvement" [Ref. 24, p. 742]
.




Title I - Establishment of House and Senate Budget Committees
a. General
The establishment of Budget Committees, with responsibility
for overseeing the entire budget making process, has been central to
Congressional plans for budget reform from the onset. Title I, under the
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Act, establishes the House and Senate Budget Committees whose focus will
be the implementation of macro-economic policy through the budget - some-
thing no other Congressional committee has ever done. They have overall
responsibility for coordinating Congressional spending and determining
fiscal policy requirements, the key actions in Congress choosing among
competing national budgetary priorities,
b. Membership/Organization
The Budget Committees consist of 25 members in the House
and 16 members in the Senate. The House Budget Committee is the only
major committee in Congress to have rotating membership: five from the
Ways and Means Committee; five from the Appropriations Committee; 13 at
large members; and one member each from the majority and the minority
leadership. It is significant that a total of ten members come from
committees well versed in appropriations and revenue legislation. This
could serve to perpetuate the predominance of two largely conservative
committees in budget making decisions. Additionally, it should encourage
harmonious working relationships. In- February 19 75, Representative
Brock Adams (D-Wash) was elected committee chairman. The remaining 24
members are divided as follows : 16 Democrat and 8 Republican [Appendix
B].
All HBC members are selected by party caucuses, including
the Chairman who is not required to have been a member of any specific
standing committee. Additionally, two procedural points differ from
those of other House committees. First, no member may serve more than
four years during any ten-year period. Seccrnd, selection of members is
made without regard to seniority. The four-year time limitation may
present an unusual problem in that this may not allow sufficient time
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for the HBC to develop a standing body of budgetary expertise. To
lessen this problem, one-half of the original HBC membership was offset
two years to allow term overlap. Staff members may be expected to
provide this necessary continuity.
The Senate Budget Committee's 16 members have no limitation
on length of service nor any quotas for selection from other standing
committees. As in the House, all SBC members are selected by party
caucuses, including the Chairman. Thus, the SBC membership is relatively
permanent in comparison to HBC membership. Additionally, as of January
19 77, SBC members may serve on only one other major committee. In July
19 74, Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me) was elected chairman. The remaining
15 members are divided as follows: 10 Democrat and 5 Republican
[Appendix C]
.
When the two Budget Committees were organized, they were
established to overlay the traditional Congressional committee structure.
The Budget Committees were not intended to diminish in any way the
responsibilities or prerogatives of other committees. They neither
eliminate nor reduce the importance of existing procedures for authori-
zation of programs or appropriation of funds. They are supposed to
perform new tasks related to establishing fiscal policy and priorities,
and in so doing, facilitate and complement the functions of the existing
committees. To this end, both Budget Committees formed Task Forces (TF)
to study the critical issues which serve to focus Congress' fiscal and
economic decision making. The SBC has thus far created four ad hoc
Task Forces: Energy, Defense, Tax Policy and Tax Expenditures, and
Capital Needs [Membership contained in Appendix D]. The HBC has formed
seven such Task Forces: Budget Process, Tax Expenditures, Economic
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Projections, National Security Programs, Human Resource Programs,
Physical Resources Programs, and Community Resources Programs [Membership
contained in Appendix E]. The first three HBC Task Forces will concentrate
on broad general areas as they affect future policy, while the other four
have assigned to- them the broad, general categories into which many
annual, recurring Federally financed programs are divided.
The name Task Force was chosen rather than the normal
Congressional title of subcommittee. This apparently was done for several
reasons. First, the TF groups were created as ad hoc working committees
and are not considered to be permanent in nature. Second, the TF's are
not intended to be investigative in the strictest sense of the word, but
are to assist in establishing appropriate fiscal policy so that a frame
of reference and long-term perspective for making responsible budgetary
and economic decisions is present. Finally, the term Task Force was
used to avoid a one-on-one confrontation with already entrenched sub-
committees of the existing standing committees (e.g., Appropriations,
Armed Services and Public Works).
Also, the TF's prefer to call their hearings "seminars."
As an example, the HBC Task Force on National Security Programs used a
seminar format, with witness statements limited to no more than ten
minutes, to educate and acquaint the TF members with DOD operations and
problems. These initial seminars were reported to have been excellent
learning experiences. The usual "canned" or "staged" testimony was
replaced with a very meaningful and multifaceted interchange between
witness and Task Force members. Apparently, the TF's will continue to




Originally, the Joint Study Committee had contemplated a
Joint Legislative Budget Staff with a Director who would serve both
Budget Committees [Ref. 66, PT. 2, p. 223], but this proposal was
abandoned in later versions of the Act. According to House and Senate
rules, all standing committees, which the Budget Committees are, are
authorized their own staffs. Thus, even if a special staff were formed
to serve both committees, there was every reason to expect each to
establish its own staff. Consequently, each Budget Committee now has its
own staff of approximately sixty persons. On the SBC, each Senator is
authorized two personal staff representatives (one professional and one
research assistant or secretary) . This arrangement is provided since
Senators must serve as members of more than one other major committee.
HBC member personal staff representatives are much fewer (7 professionals
and 7 secretaries) which results in the HBC having a larger core staff
available to perform staff analysis.
d. Jurisdiction
The new Budget Committees have been given general
jurisdiction over the entire Congressional budget process and related
matters. The HBC and SBC have virtually identical jurisdictions.
Specifically, their duties are (1) to report at least two concurrent
Q
resolutions on the budget each year; (2) to make continuing studies of
These concurrent resolutions establish Congressional targets for
total budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficit and public debt and
breakdown the spending (budget authority and outlays) totals in terms of
major functions for a fiscal year.
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the effect of existing and proposed legislation on Federal spending;
(3) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expenditures and
methods of coordinating tax expenditures with direct budget outlays; and
(4) to oversee operations of the CBO. Although the Budget Committees
were carefully constituted to avoid threatening established committees'
jurisdiction, a potential for conflict still exists. The problem lies
in the fact that some interpret the Budget Committees' jurisdiction in a
very narrow sense; i.e., limiting their jurisdiction strictly to those
items assigned in the Act. Others feel that the Budget Committees'
jurisdiction covers all budget related matters which are not strictly
within another committee's jurisdiction.
One of the first jurisdictional disagreements arose over
the impoundment control portion of the Act late in 1974. The Act
requires the President to submit to Congress proposals for deferring or
rescinding expenditures that have been previously appropriated by
Congress. However, it does not specify which committee in the House or
Senate would handle this type of legislation. Confrontation was averted
in the House when a parliamentarian ruled that the HBC would not have
jurisdiction until at least 1976. However, in the Senate both John L.
McClellan (D-Ark) , the strong Appropriations Committee Chairman, and
Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me) , Budget Committee Chairman, claimed jurisdiction.
Even a third committee, Public Works, joined the dispute claiming this
particular impoundment partly dealt with highway funds. The Democratic
Caucus finally ended the debate by proposing a compromise. Deferral and
rescission legislation would be referred jointly to both the Budget and
the Appropriations Committees, along with any other committees claiming
jurisdiction. These committees would then have 20 days to report their
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recommendations to the Appropriations Committee. After receipt, the
Appropriations Committee is obliged to report the recommendations to the
floor whether it favors them or not. The Senate Budget Committee regarded
this outcome as a significant victory as it helped to establish the
importance of the new committee.
e. Self-Perceptions and Intra-Congressional Relationships
Self-perceived roles of Senate and House of Representative
members are fairly well known [Refs. 16, 28 and 73]. The Senate likes
to project itself as a conservative, more prestigious body; a great
forum acting as a sounding board. In regard to the Senate, Mr. Nelson
Polsby notes, "... its organizational flexibility enables it to
incubate policy innovations, to advocate, to respond, to launch its
great debates, in short to pursue the continuous renovation of American
public policy through the hidden hand of self-promotion of its members"
[Ref. 43]. On the other hand, the House of Representatives conceives
itself as a highly specialized instrument for processing legislation.
Because of its structured division of labor, the House has a better
grasp of details and actively promotes specialized experts. It sees
itself as more liberal and closer to its constituents.
Their respective Budget Committees view themselves much
in the same light. Tne SBC sees its role as employing negotiations and
not law enforcement. It feels it is necessary to engage in a process of
bargaining with other committees in order to establish a meaningful
dialogue between all of them. The SBC is inclined to maintain this
negotiating role while pointing out the consequences of not following its
recommendations, particularly in floor debates. It believes that it is
now setting precedence; and, in noting their recent success in influencing
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rejection of the conference report on the Fiscal 1976 Defense Weapons
9
Procurement Bill, the authors are inclined to agree. The SBC will
probably find it necessary to become more involved in some issues, but
their overall approach is to avoid involvement with "line-item" type
decisions which it views as the prerogative of the authorizing and
appropriating committees. This approach is consistent with the alleged
need to acquire a broad understanding of the fiscal implications of
national policy decisions.
In comparison, the HBC sees itself more as a prober and
motivator. They prefer to do their work with the other committees prior
to bills getting to the House floor. Much like its Senate counterpart,
the HBC intends to take a macro, forward-looking approach when studying
issues rather than getting bogged down in specifics. For example, the
HBC eventually would like to show House members a "light at the. end of
the tunnel" in regard to the Nation's current deficit budgeting problems.
Its staffers feel that not much can be done with a budget in one year;
therefore, the emphasis should be on the future years. Additionally, it
should be noted that the HBC, in keeping with the House's detailed
approach, has set up a specific Task Force for dealing with the budget
process itself [Appendix E]
.
Possibly another insight into how Congressmen perceive the
Budget Committees' relative importance can be drawn from contrasting the
9On August 1, 1975 the Senate, on urging from the Senate Budget
Committee, rejected the Fiscal 1976 Defense Weapons Procurement Conference
report (HP. 6674). The $25.8 billion authorization for new Defense De-
partment weapons, research and development was turned aside 42-48, as
SBC Chairman liuskie (D--Me) argued that the report "will inevitably bust




Chairman of each committee. It will be recalled that Representative
Al Ullman (D-Ore) dropped the chairmanship of the HBC in favor of the
House Ways and Means Committee chairmanship. Some observers saw this as
a direct blow to the prestige of the House Budget Committee. In
comparison, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me) surrendered his prestigious
Foreign Relations Committee seat in order to become chairman of the
Senate Budget Committee [Ref. 51, p. 592].
Relationships between the two Budget Committees have thus
far been on an informal or staff working level basis. The prevailing
mood is that a good working relationship between the two committees is
required and that it should continue in that vein. As an example, HBC
staff members intend to discuss alternatives and issues with their SBC
colleagues prior to requesting formal studies from the CBO. On the
other hand, SBC staff personnel expressed some disdain of the HBC
leadership. They felt that the HBC had avoided its responsibilities
a necessary ingredient in making this budget reform process work
properly - while the SBC had amply demonstrated its willingness to stand
up to the Senate and enforce its spending targets.
Relationships between the Budget Committees and other
standing committees are far less clear. The Budget Committees are
somewhat analogous to the new kid on the block. In this sense, the Act
has given the new committees a very large bat and thrust them directly
into the only game in town. However, they must be very careful not to
In this regard, it was felt that Chairman Adams could have been
more vigorous in attempting to enforce budget targets during House
floor debates on several spending bills.
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overstep their authority. Initially, the Budget Committees have moved
very slowly and cautiously within the legal framework mandated,
assiduously trying to avoid any direct confrontation with existing
standing committees. Throughout this trial run period, they have been
working under this handicap. If they recommend setting targets for
specific spending programs, they risk alienating other committees without
whose cooperation successful budget reform would be doubtful. Thus, it
becomes clear that the two committees are attempting to "stake out
their turf," while trying to remain nonabrasive.
How long this conciliatory mood will prevail is another
question. The SBC seems much less reluctant than the HBC to flex its
new muscles as evidenced by Chairman Muskie's strong stance in regard to
the Fiscal 19 76 Defense Weapons Procurement Conference report. This
action has resulted in at least one subtle, operational change according
to one SBC staffer. Prior to this "test case," few sought SBC advice;
however, other standing committee staffs are now beginning to actively
seek out SBC opinions on various issues.
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) is a key man to watch during this
evolving process. He is unique in that he serves on both the Senate
Budget and the Armed Services Committees. During the floor debate on
the Fiscal 19 76 Defense Weapons Procurement Bill mentioned above,
Senator Nunn noted: "Unless the Budget Committee and the Budget
Committee staff begin to relate the difference between authorizations
and outlays, we cannot have a responsible defense budget resolution."
He further added that he hoped a greater understanding of the budget
process would be developed during this debate by the Armed Services
Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Budget Committee jRef.
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60]. Additionally, one House observer noted that because of the
potential force possessed by the SBC, "some senior members of the Senate
Appropriations Committee are fearful that in time it might eclipse
their committee." Recognizing this concern, Senator Jacob K. Javits
(R-NY) warned his fellow SBC colleagues that "under no circumstances
should we be considered competitive with or duplicative of the
Appropriations Committee " [Ref. 7, p. 2418]
.
Thus, it appears that only time will tell whether a
greater understanding has developed between these active players; but
one thing seems certain, the curial "pie" will have to provide an
additional, unaccustomed "slice" for the new player - the Senate Budget
Committee.
The House Budget Committee has been less forceful,
perhaps due to the rotating membership feature or to its actual
composition and leadership. Also, they have received less public notice
because most of their work has been accomplished at the committee level.
Initial feelings among HBC staff personnel were that the House Armed
Services Committee viewed them as a threat. This view has apparently
passed as the Budget Committee has been very careful in developing and
assuming their role. In fact, their efforts thus far have emphasized
taking no stand which might provoke a confrontation and thereby threaten
the entire process. They believe the reform process must survive.
They feel strongly that, with some possible minor modifications,
relations with other standing committees will continue to be cordial.
Although the HBC failed to achieve bipartisan support for their first
budget resolution, the budget reform process apparently is actively
supported by both House leadership and committee senior staff members.
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As a case in point, Representative George Mahon (D-Tex) , Chairman of
the House Appropriations Committee, has supported budget reform efforts
and will presumably continue to work closely with the HBC.
f. Relationships with the Executive Branch and its Agencies
Relationships between Budget Committee and Executive
Branch personnel have, thus far, been informal and friendly. This may
be partly due to the desire to get off on the right foot or possibly
because many of the defense associated Budget Committee staff personnel
were previously employed by Executive agencies, such as OMB and DOD
{Appendix F]. Thus, in many cases, these people are acquainted or
really are old friends. However, there are several aspects which should
not go unmentioned.
OMB has indicated that they would prefer not to serve as
a filter for Budget Committee queries directed to other Executive
Department agencies, such as the Defense Department. Instead, they
prefer to deal with the CBO, using it as the Capitol Hill focal point
or "clearing house" for Congressional budget matters.
Also of interest is the fact that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)
office, the old Systems Analysis shop, was assigned the primary
responsibility for dealing with the two Budget Committees rather than
the OSD Comptroller organization. This apparently was because of the
manner in which Secretary Schlesinger viewed the role of these new
Congressional committees. Ostensibly, he must have perceived the Budget
Committees as being concerned more with programs and issues rather than
with specific line-items and accounting data.
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g. Liaison with the Department of the Navy
The Secretary of the Navy assigned the Comptroller of the
Navy (NAVCOMP) the primary responsibility for Department of the Navy
(DON) relations and liaison with the two Budget Committees and the CBO
[Ref. 48]. This assignment was in addition to NAVCOMP' s previous
Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) and General Accounting Office
(GAO) liaison duties. Dealings with the four Congressional committees
and their staffs are conducted through the NAVCOMP Appropriations
Committees Liaison Office (NAVCOMPLIA) . (This office is presently
staffed by one very capable and extremely busy Navy commander (0-5)).
Normally, routine DON Congressional liaison matters and communications
are conducted directly with the four Congressional committees and are
not formally submitted or filtered through OSD and/or 0MB. Figure 1
depicts this flow of information.
h. Summary
The Budget Committees were created to provide Congress an
expert perspective on budget totals and on fiscal policy requirements.
They must keep track of all the money bills and attempt to enforce
target resolutions. They will be performing a function not previously
undertaken by any Congressional committee. The Budget Committees will
be the primary instruments of change in this new procedure. Its members
will be in a position to influence greatly the pattern of Federal
spending. Next year they will be under a new kind of pressure - they
must discuss spending priorities when they include spending by function
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in their budget resolutions. As one staff member told the authors,
"If nothing else, it is going to be one hell of an experience up here on
the Hill."
2. Title II - Congressional Budget Office
a. General
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was initially
conceived by the Joint Study Committee as a Joint Legislative Budget
Staff which would serve the two Budget Committees alone. However, this
concept was continuously modified as the Act was hammered out by the
two chambers. In its final form, the Congressional Budget Office
emerged as a cross between the Congressional Office of the Budget
proposed by the Senate and the Legislative Budget Office put forth in
the House bill. The CBO was established as a separate informational
and anaJ_ytical arm of Congress. It will function as Congress' central
resource providing a wide range of fiscal and budgetary information and
analyses. Additionally, it will serve not only the two Budget Committees,
but all of the Congress. The CBO was officially created in February
1975 upon appointment of its first Director.
b. Responsibilities, Duties and Organization
The law has given the CBO far-reaching and important
responsibilities. Basically, these responsibilities can be summarized
as follows: (1) monitor the economy and assess the impact of alternative
Fiscal 1976 "dry run" first concurrent budget resolution did not
specify target totals for the 16 individual functional areas of the
budget. Target totals were included only to serve as guidelines and
explain how the committees arrived at aggregate totals [Ref. 52], Next









- O)™ ohiective analyses of budget
alternatives Including cost studies, as necessary.
The Act puts the Congress in the business of making
decisions on fiscal policv - nf a~~-a-P y o oecrdrng the amount of government surplus
or deficit appropriate to the state of the economy in the next fiscal
-r. ^ CBO will provlde backgromd ,„ these f±acai ^^^ dMisions
» the form of fluently updated forecasts of economic activity and
fhe hest possible estimates of the impact of alternative levels of
surplus or deficit on the price level H,„, the unemployment rate and other
economic indicators. Several M**s different econometric models will be
employed to provide these economic forecasts.
Under the new process, Congress sets its own budget
-rgets in the first concurrent resolution on the budget and needs to
know thereafter how closplv -ft- *„ m. .ser it is adherrng to these targets. Thus, an
-Portent task of the CBO win be WekeW - providing ,„
the effect of potential legislative ac£lons^ ^ ^ ^ ^
quires the CBO to provide four types of fiscal forecasts:
(1) annually, "as soon as practicable after the be-
ginning of each fiscal year (1 Octoh.r-1 " <=•U ober), a five-year projection of
budget authority and outlaw ,=,tlays, revenues and tax expenditures, plus the
Projected deficit or surplus, year by year,
(2) for every committee bili providing new budget
authority, a five-year projection of the outlays which will result
,
(3) for every committee bill providing new or increased
tax expenditures (e.e an -,•„-,-g., mciease xn the tax dividend exclusion), a
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five-year projection of the resulting losses of revenue. Both in this
and in the case cf outlay estimates mentioned in (2) above, the actual
projection is to be made by the reporting committee after consultation
with the CBO,
"(4) for every other public bill reported from committee
(except from the Appropriations Committees), a five-year estimate of the
costs associated with enacting the bill. In this case, the CBO estimate
must be included in the committee report if it can practicably be
furnished on time.
Another important job of the CBO is to provide objective
staff analysis of budget choices and the costs and probable effects of
each in a comprehensible fashion. In this regard, the Act mandates
that the CBO must submit an annual report by 1 April each year to the
Budget Committees. The Act states that this report will deal with
budget alternatives, tax expenditures, and national budget priorities.
In the eyes of CBO personnel, the report will, of course, do this; but
it will also represent a compendium of all the issues and alternatives
produced in the last year. In all probability, there will be a massive
effort to have the Annual Report ready much earlier than the 1 April
deadline set by the Act. In reality, the CBO would like to produce this
report no later than mid-February so that it will be useful to the Budget
Committees during their mark-up sessions leading to reporting of the
budget resolution.
The Act specifies that the CBO shall be headed by an
appointed Director, It also provides for a Deputy Director who shall
perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the Director. The
first Director, Dr. Alice M. Rivlin, has chosen to organize the CBO into
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seven major divisions to accomplish the tasks specified under the law.
Figure 2 illustrates the organizational structure as presently
envisioned. The duties of these divisions are:
(1) The Fiscal Policy Division will analyze the
condition of the economy, including inflation, unemployment, production,
incomes and credit. It will prepare projections of the economic future
and develop measures of how the future will be altered by various
economic policies or developments.
(2) The Tax Policy Division will be responsible for
revenue estimation, analysis of tax expenditures and studies of the
incidence of alternative tax structures.
(3) The Energy and Physical Resources Division will be
responsible for preparing comprehensive analyses of possible budget
alternatives in the areas of energy, environment, natural resources,
science, agriculture and rural development, commerce, transportation
and communication.
(4) The Human Resources and Community Development
Division will provide policy analyses of major programs and budget
allocation choices facing Congress in the areas of income assistance,
education and employment, health and veterans affairs and community
development and housing.
(5) The Management Programs Division will have two
roles. First, it will provide internal administrative and management
support services for all other components of the CBO, Second, it will
provide information and analyses of government programs and conduct
studies of the budget issues involved in government-wide organization,
















































































































(6) The Budget Analysis Division will be responsible
for ensuring that accurate and comprehensive budget data is available
in a timely manner to support the Congressional budget cycle information
and analyses requirements.
(7) The National Security and International Affairs
Division will perform studies and analyses of budget matters relating
to the defense establishment and international economic programs.
Additionally, the CBO Director will have two staff
support sections - a General Counsel (legal) and an Office of Information
(public affairs) [Ref. 45J . Functions and activities of the Budget
Analysis and the National Security and International Affairs Divisions
will be discussed further in the following paragraphs.
c. Staffing
After many variations as to exactly how a Director for
the CBO would be appointed, a two-step procedure was devised. The
Director is appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate after considering recommendations from the two
Budget Committees, which have oversight responsibilities for the office.
Appointment is required to be without regard to political affiliation.
The Director may be removed by simple resolution of either House. The
Director's term of office was initially set at six years, but during a
House-Senate conference, it was reduced to four years.
Dr. Alice M. Rivlin, an economist, a former Senior Fellow
at the Brookings Institution, and a past Assistant Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), was sworn in as the CBO's first Director on
24 February 19 75, some eight months after the Act was signed into law.
As reported in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, part of the
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delay was due to a disagreement between the Senate and the House as to
the CBO's role. The Senate apparently saw the office as a policy-
oriented agency which would actively propose alternatives to OMB 's
budget submissions. However, the House viewed the CBO as a neutral,
analytic arm of -Congress similar to the General Accounting Office. In
an early February agreement between Representative Adams (D-Wash) and
Senator Muskie (D-Me) , it was decided to hire Dr. Rivlin as Director
with the understanding that she would adopt a low-key, neutral approach
[Ref. 51, p. 593-594]
.
Under provisions of the Act, the Director is authorized
to hire staff personnel, experts and consultants on a nonpartisan basis.
This authority includes the power to select a Deputy Director. Early
estimates put the total CBO staff requirement at approximately 159
personnel. As of 15 July 1975, a staff size in excess of 250 was
planned. Dr. Rivlin justifies the anticipated size of the CBO staff by
enumerating the number and complexity of its assigned tasks. She has
indicated that her staff will require a mix of analytical expertise and
practical budget experience to handle the CBO's variety of related
responsibilities. She has said that the CBO "needs people who think
clearly, write comprehensibly, and are able to present different points
of view fairly and without bias" [Ref. 45, p. 6]
.
d. Functions of the Budget Analysis Division
This Division's primary task is to ensure that accurate
and comprehensive budget information is made available to Congress in a
timely manner. It is divided into two general groups. The first is
concerned primarily with preparation, analysis, and the tracking of
budget estimates. The second group is concerned with the budget process,
budget concepts, and the automated information system.
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As required by the Act, a five-year projection of
Congressional budget actions will be prepared soon after the beginning
of the new fiscal year (1 October) . It will serve as the basic fiscal
forecast for formulating the Congressional budget. This CBO projection
will, in effect, be a current services budget projection very similar
in concept to the President's current services budget projection
submitted by 10 November. In practice, this projection will probably
differ from the President's both because of the date when "current
services" is defined (which could include different Congressional actions
than current services defined at an earlier or later date) , and because
there will be differing economic assumptions and opinions regarding what
constitutes current services; e.g., in such programs as Research and
Development (R&D) and major weapons procurement. Additionally, the CBO
will prepare five-year cost analysis of each bill reported out of
committee (other than Appropriations Committees) and will assist
committees of either House to prepare five-year projections of spend-out
rates of all new legislation under review.
The Budget Analysis Division also anticipates that the
Joint Economic Committee (JEC) will ask them to help in reviewing and
evaluating the President's current services budget. In this analysis,
the CBO will compare its own current services budget projection with
the President's. They will ensure accuracy of the estimates, provide
comparisons with prior year budgets and, in general, verify the
validity of the various economic assumptions upon which it is built.
In this regard, the CBO has been working closely with 0MB in an attempt
to standardize man}7 of the basic assumptions and methods utilized in
preparation of cost estimates.
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Discussions were still being held within CBO to establish
an underlying budget philosophy and the basic guidelines for developing
and analyzing the current services budget and five-year budget estimates.
Some of the major topics under consideration were the treatment of
inflation, on-going Federal programs and discretionary spending. There
was some feeling that, for budget estimates to be realistic, different
rules may have to be applied to different functional areas and Federal
programs. For example, estimates of programs involving multi-year
purchases of high technology and/or large capital investment items should
be adjusted for inflation. Also, projections of programs that are more
or less of an on-going nature would be expected to continue even if the
current law expires within the period. Both of these aspects are
particularly applicable to a large portion of the defense budget.
It is also in this Division that the budget scorekeeping
function is to be performed. This function was previously accomplished
by the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures. The
essential change will be that the score must now be kept with respect
to the Congressional budget by major functions lAppendix Gj rather than
with respect to the President's budget. This Division has been working
with GAO and the Congressional committees to develop a revised format
to meet the needs of the new budget process. Its first report was made
in June 19 75 iRef. 70]. At the present time, different report formats
are required by the House and Senate Budget Committees, and all the work
is being accomplished manually. They are hopeful that the scorekeeping
function will soon be automated, providing a capability to make on-line
changes and obtain real-time readouts.
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The Budget Analysis Division will provide costing
estimates of defense alternatives for the CBO National Security and
International Affairs Division. On defense related issues, the feeling
was that the present information provided by the Defense Department was
good, but insufficient in detail. Additional data will be required for
them to make meaningful analyses. A number of their personnel are
ex-DOD, OMB or service personnel who possess the necessary understanding
of defense programs [Appendix F], They feel that DOD will be more than
willing to provide the information they require, although they quickly
pointed out that there are formal ways to obtain the data, if necessary.
This Division intends to be quantitatively oriented,
while focusing its major effort in the area of cost analyses and
estimates. They will produce the CBO cost analyses which must be
attached to every authorization bill going through Congress. In the
future, lack of this estimate may be enough to table the bill. On the
other hand, too high an estimate may be perilous to the bill and may
well provide, the impetus for the bill to become a "budget buster."
e. Functions of the National Security and International
Affairs Division
This Division's primary charge is to carry out studies
and analyses of budget matters relating to the defense establishment
and international economic programs. It will work closely with the two
Budget Committees' defense Task Forces in analyzing budget alternatives.
It too is divided broadly into two groups. The first is primarily
concerned with defense, arms control and intelligence budget issues.
The second group will examine the impact on the economy and on the
Federal budget of foreign programs.
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This Division was late being formed and is presently at
about 60 percent of its planned end-strength of 30 people. Their hiring
policy is geared toward finding academic brillance coupled with defense
or defense-related experience. In the event that both of these
qualities can not be found in an individual, the edge will be given to
the former. They are looking for a balance of international experts,
defense economists, and political scientists. Their organizational
concept is less structured and will be project-oriented. They intend
to pursue the economist's discipline and focus investigations on
effectiveness rather than looking strictly at numbers.
Division personnel voiced their concern over whether a
mission-oriented budget would provide anything meaningful to Congress.
They noted that one must be thoughtful about the answer you want from
the budget before you go and restructure it completely. Conceptually,
they hoped that mission-oriented questions would not be incorporated
into the new budget format.
Instead, they forsee their biggest problem as finding an
answer to the question: How do we accomplish the best possible analytic
work? They intend to employ independent reality checks, internal and
external reviews, and their own expertise to ensure complete, detached
analyses. No advocacy will be involved, although they realize no matter
what they do, not everyone will be pleased. To this end, they intend to
forge a close complementary working relationship with the Budget
Committees. They believe an effort will have to be devoted in working
with the other committees and in gaining their trust and friendship.
They realized that some of the other committees are not overjoyed with
their existence. They, however, are determined to resolve that through
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hard work. Their intention is to dazzle these committees with powerful,
rich analytical studies which will open their eyes,
f. Relationships with Congressional Agencies
As noted earlier, the CBO is a separate, non-partisan
agency of Congress. As such, it intends to cooperate and utilize fully
services and facilities of the General Accounting Office, the Library of
Congress and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
While the CBO intends to draw upon any existing
expertise on Capitol Hill, it hopes to develop its own respected
position among these other agencies. The CBO feels that the analytical
expertise they are going to provide was lacking and that this is one of
the primary reasons for the entire budget reform Act. As prescribed by
the Act, GAO will assume a major role in the new budgeting process and
will play a big part in carrying out the program evaluation provisions
of Title VII. Additionally, CBO hopes to work closely with them under
12
the authority of Title VIII. Under this title, GAO will develop,
establish and maintain improved fiscal, budgetary and program-related
information for Congress. These matters will be discussed more fully in
the following sections. Thus, the Congressional Budget Office intends
to utilize effectively all available Congressional resources in develop-
ment of their own balanced position. Also, the CBO desires to build a
reputation for good, sound analytical work. They fully realize that to
be useful to members of Congress, they must prepare reports that are
12
The CBO will assist GAO in developing a legislative classification
structure system which will relate the budget to authorization statutes.
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short (12 to 18 pages) , not overwhelming In detail and capable of
13 ''-
passing the "subway test."
g. Relationships with Committees and Members of Congress
The Act specifies the CBO's duties in accordance with
four levels of priority: (1) The House and Senate Budget Committees are
given the highest priority. The CBO is to provide them with budget
related data and assign personnel to them, as necessary, on a temporary
basis. It will also undertake budget related studies upon their request.
(2) High priority is also given to the two Appropriations Committees, the
House Ways and Means, and the Senate Finance Committees. The CBO will
furnish them with budget information, provide staff assistance to them
and undertake budget related studies at their request. (3) All other
Congressional committees are entitled to available budget data, staff
assistance and budget related studies, as time permits. (4) All members
of Congress are entitled to available budget information, but no studies
may be initiated on their behalf.
The Act provides for a close and continuing relationship
between the CBO and the two Budget Committees. We have already seen
that the CBO Director essentially serves at the pleasure of the Budget
Committee Chairmen. It will be interesting to see how she intends to
serve two different masters, simultaneously. The CBO and its Director
have been very careful not to step on toes, but sooner or later conflict-
ing desires may develop. As long as Dr. Rivlin can maintain her position
13
Reports that members of Congress can fully digest and understand
in the subway on their way from the House or Senate office buildings to
the Chambers to vote.
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of neutrality and at the same time turn out meaningful analytical work,
there may be no problems. The CBO will be expected to develop issues
for, and as directed by, the two Budget Committees. This task may be
one of the simpler ones compared to providing information to the other
committees, many of which still do not understand the budget process.
The problem may revert back to the jurisdictional issues developed
earlier in this chapter. If the Budget Committees have unsettled
jurisdictional problems with the other committees, the CBO could easily
be caught right in the middle.
h. Relationships with the Executive Branch and Its Agencies
Through all the iterations of development, the Act
always provided broad authority for the CBO to secure information from
Executive agencies. As enacted, the law authorizes the Director to
obtain information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the
various agencies without Budget Committee approval. The one exception
is that information which is specifically prohibited by law from being
disclosed. Additionally, the Director may, upon agreement with the
agency head, utilize the agency's services, facilities, and personnel.
One specific issue considered during formulation of the
Act was the question of Congressional access to Executive agency budget
estimates which are submitted to OMB. During the 93rd Congress, Senator
Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me) introduced legislation which would have required
Executive agencies to provide Congress with these estimates automatically
at the same time they were given to OMB [Ref. 62, p. 80-S1J . The
incumbent Administration objected vehemently and thus were able to keep
this specific requirement out of the current Act. However, the issue
remains unresolved; and although the CBO could raise the issue at any
time again, OMB would in all likelihood resist such a move.
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OMB' s position regarding the CBO is one of acceptance.
They view the CBO as a focal point on the Hill for budgetary matters,
and, as such, see many benefits in dealing with one representative vice
the usual many. In a recent address to the Armed Forces Comptroller
Association, Dr. Rivlin described the CBO/OMB relationship most amicably:
The Office of Management and Budget seems
pleased to have someone on the Hill to talk
to, with whom OMB can discuss overall budget
strategy [Ref. 44].
However, there were people within CBO who felt that OMB did not want to
be used as a communications channel. While the OMB desires to see the
new process work, for it would make the job of managing the budget
easier, it also desires to maintain the status quo . They fear that the
type of detailed information Congress may want would inundate both it
and the CBO. They maintain that detailed DOD information is not even
used by them. It is for DOD internal decision making and not necessary
for the CBO to develop broad national economic alternatives. Although
it appears to be OMB's nature to resist changing the present defense
submission, CBO personnel commented that, thus far, OMB has been
extremely cooperative.
The CBO has hired not only OSD personnel, but also some
OMB personnel [Appendix F] . The implication being that these individuals
are aware of what information is or is not available, and also which
information is desirable. In this regard, some interest was expressed
in obtaining internal DOD/DON budget decision documents and issue papers.
While the Act does provide the CBO broad authority for
obtaining necessary budgetary information from the Executive agencies,
the actual wording of the provision is so general and vague as to leave
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this critical issue open to some degree of interpretation. However,
the legislative intent cf this provision apparently was to provide the
basis for the CBO's mission. At this juncture, it is too early to
determine the extent to which the CBO may find it necessary to rely upon
this authority. In the future, this aspect of the new Act will probably
become a critical issue.
i. Computer Capability
The Act does provide for the CBO to equip itself with an
up-to-date computer capability and to obtain services of experts and
consultants in computer technology. To date, the CBO has contracted
with American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS) to develop preliminary
specifications for an automated budget information system. The AMS
report produced [Ref. 1] is presently being reviewed and discussed with
various Congressional users prior to making any decisions on the
development of a comprehensive budget information system. This matter
will be discussed further in the Title VIII section. In the meantime,
the CBO is developing two automated systems: (1) Interim scorekeeping,
and (2) the budget projection model. Either or both could serve as a
nucleus of a Congressional budget information system. Initially, the
CBO plans to utilize the existing computer facilities of the House
Information Services, Senate Computer Services and Library of Congress
Computer Center to support their data processing requirements.
j . Summary
The Congressional Budget Office is a new kind of
organization. It is, in a sense, still growing. It is essentially
feeling its way along, writing its own charter on a day-by-day basis.
The CBO's real role will continue to gradually evolve, and may not be
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clear for several years. Its mission, however, is relatively clear.
The CBO must provide Congress with detailed and highly accurate budget
data - something Congress has lacked in the past. It must assist
Congress in implementing this new budget process and through selected
studies dipicting policy alternative impacts aid in the entire budget
decision making process.
If the CBO is to survive and function as envisioned in
the Act, the Director must ensure that it remains a neutral, analytic
arm of Congress staffed by highly professional people. It must be
flexible and responsive, yet avoid advocacy. And finally, the CBO must
continue to carefully develop harmonious relations with all Congress-
ional committees. It has the toughest job of the three new
instrumentalities
.
3 . Title III - Congressional Budget Proces s
a. Overview
Section 300 of the Act, although having no independent
legal authority, provides a convenient timetable with respect to the
Congressional budget process for any fiscal year (Figure 3) . It can
readily be seen that the process is critically time-phased and inter-
locking. As such, a delay at any key point can reverberate throughout
the entire timetable and actually prevent completion of the process
prior to the next fiscal year (1 October) . Figure 4 provides a
pictorial comparison between this new budget process and the old procedure
Looking at Figure 3, it should become clear that the
entire process is organized around adoption of the two concurrent
resolutions on the budget. The first resolution must be adopted prior
to 15 May. Also, 15 May is the deadline for the reporting of all
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CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET TIMETABLE "1
On or before Action to be completed
10 November President submits current services
budget.
15th day after Congress meets President submits his budget.
15 March Committees submit reports to the
Budget Committees.
1 April Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees
.
15 April Budget Committees report first
concurrent resolution on the
budget to their Houses.
15 May
,
Committees report bills author-
izing new budget authority.
15 May - Congress adopts first concurrent
resolution on the budget.
7th day after Labor Day Congress completes action on
bills providing budget authority
and spending authority.
15 September Congress completes actions on
second required concurrent
resolution on the budget.





1 October Fiscal year begins.
Source: CRS 75-33 S, CRS-6, 5 February 1975.
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authorizing legislation by the various enabling committees. To
facilitate meeting the 15 May deadline, the Act requires that all
requests for new authorizations be submitted one year in advance (e.g.,
requests for fiscal year 19 78 must be submitted by 15 May 19 76). Both
deadlines must be met before floor consideration of ensuing revenue or
spending legislation. The second resolution must be adopted prior to
15 September or after action has been completed on all regular appro-
priations. The new budget process can be viewed as beginning in the
Fall of the year when, by 10 November, the President must submit his
current services budget. At this point, key dates presented in Figure
3 will be chronologically discussed and some of the considerations and
unwritten "rules" involved in this phased process will be elaborated.
b. The Current Services Budget
The concept of a current services budget is not new.
Charles Schultze, former Director, Bureau of the Budget, has advanced
this idea several times in the past [Ref. 4]. Aaron Wildavsky, in his
statement before the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and
Expenditures 12 April 1973, also proposed a similar concept [Ref. 66,
PT. 1, p. 390]. The idea had been around, in one form or another, for
a number of years, but it had never been formally articulated in a law.
From Congress' point of view, the President's current
services budget will serve as a base from which to project budget data
into the future and to assess economic impacts. It gives Congress an
earlier look at year-to-year alterations in the President's budget. By
law, the Joint Economic Committee must provide the Budget Committees with
and economic evaluation of the current services budget by 31 December.
The CBO intends to prepare their own version of the current services
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budget as a basis for developing the Congressional budget. This CBO
current services budget also will be utilized as the base for analyzing
and verifying the President's 10 November current services budget
submission and for evaluating alternative budget proposals which Congress
may have under consideration.
It was learned that Dr. Alice Rivlin, Congressional
Budget Office Director, views the current services budget as the "thing"
of the future. As such, CBO staff personnel are developing an automated
budget information system that will incorporate a capability for applying
the necessary economic adjustments and then quickly comparing the
"baseline" current services budget with the President's January budget,
submission. This comparative read-out would present summary totals by
function and could be quiried to identify specified program differences
(increments or decrements) in the President's budget. These changes
would provide an indication of the President's changing budget priorities,
c. President's Budget Submission
The President submits his budget to Congress 15 days
after it convenes in January. In the past few years, it has become
common for Congress to grant 0MB an extension for submission of most of
the budget back-up material. However, it was learned that 0MB has
already been informed by the Appropriations Committee Chairmen that a
delay in submission of the Fiscal 19 77 budget will not be tolerated.
This, of course, puts more pressure on 0MB to prepare the budget on time.
0MB has pointed out that they will have insufficient time between the
end of the fiscal year (30 September) and early January to put together
a meaningful budget. They maintain that spending-rate data from the
past year, which is utilized in the formulation of next year's budget,
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will not be available until late November or early December. Therefore,
their hands are tied. They had argued for a permanent change to 15
February for the President's submission, but they were unsuccessful. It
can be speculated that the President's annual budget submission to
Congress will not be in any greater detail or more enlightening than in
the past.
d. Committees' Report to the Budget Committees
By 15 March, all House and Senate committees and joint
committees must submit their views, estimates and recommendations to
their respective Budget Committee. The purpose of these submissions is
to provide the Budget Committees with an early estimate of the spending
levels contemplated by the standing committees for the next fiscal year.
As a result, authorization bill hearings will now begin in the Fall of
the preceding year.
e. The Congressional Budget Office's Report to the Budget
Committees
The Act requires that on or before 1 April the CBO will
submit their report to the House and Senate Budget Committees. Although
not explicitly stated in the Act, the CBO assumes that this report will
include five-year projections of various budget alternatives, including
the President's budget, and a budget that would maintain the level of
current services. In reality, the CBO intends to provide this report,
commonly called the Annual Report, to the Budget Committees by mid-
February so that they may use it in their mark-up sessions. The report
will probably be a compilation of those issues studied by the CBO during
the preceding twelve months.
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f. Budget Committees Report the First Concurrent Resolution
The Budget Committees, having held hearings and having
received reports from other standing committees, joint committees and the
CBO, must report their first concurrent resolution on the budget to
their respective Houses by 15 April.
g. Committees Report Bills and Resolutions Authorizing New
Budget Authority
May 15 is the deadline for the reporting of authorizing
legislation by House and Senate committees. This requirement does not
apply to omnibus Social Security legislation or to entitlement measures.
An emergency provision does provide for waiver of the 15 May deadline by
resolution in either the House or the Senate.
h. Congress Completes Action of First Budget Resolution
Adoption of the first budget resolution is also
scheduled to be completed by 15 May. Failure to do so would reduce the
time available to consider pending legislation which involves budget
matters. The first concurrent resolution on the budget will set forth
appropriate levels of total budget outlays, total new budget authority,
an estimate of budget outlays and an appropriate level of new budget
authority for each major functional category, surpluses or deficits, a
recommended level of Federal revenues and an appropriate level of public
debt. Congress is prohibited from considering revenue, debt, spending,
or entitlement legislation prior to the adoption of the first budget
resolution.
This is a key date for it is by this date that the
"targets" must be set for each major functional category [Appendix G].
Many see this date as the first real test of the Act in 1976. A big
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problem may develop as all the standing committees compete to get as
large a share of the "pie" as possible. In the past, no one looked at
the whole. The normal procedure was that the budget total was
determined after the dust had settled. Now, the total will be set at
the beginning. -Thus, the shrewd players will want as much of the"action
as they initially can get. This will allow them to make cuts at a
later date when they may come under pressure.
Floor consideration of the budget resolution will be
under special rules devised to expedite the proceedings while allowing
opportunity for a fiscal policy and priorities debate and for floor
amendments. In the House, consideration is to be in the Committee of
the Whole under the five-minute rule, with ten hours allowed for debate.
In the Senate, fifty hours are allowed for general debate. The Senate
cannot adopt a budget resolution which is mathematically inconsistent;
e.g., the sum of the separate functional allocations must equal the
totals for new budget authority and outlays, and the difference between
total outlays and revenues must equal the appropriate budget surplus or
deficit. If House and Senate conferees fail to report after seven days,
they are required to report their agreements and disagreements to their
respective Houses.
i. Congress Completes Action on Appropriation and Entitlement
Bills
During the Summer (15 May to early September) , Congress
uses the levels set in the first budget resolution as targets to guide
and restrain it in shaping appropriate budget related legislation.
Congress will not be restricted as to the amounts it ultimately
appropriates, but it will be guided by the scorekeeping function performed
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by the CBO. CBO will issue periodic scorekeeping reports which will
show a comparison between the amounts in individual bills and the
appropriate level set forth earlier in the first budget resolution.
Thus, appropriation bills should proceed through
Congress during the Summer with all action to be completed by the seventh
day after Labor Day, and earlier if possible. Spending authority or
entitlement bills will have a similar timetable and be subject to the
same reconciliation process required by the second budget resolution.
j . Congress Completes Action on Second Budget Resolution
September 15 is the date set for adoption of the required
second budget resolution. This is not a firm date, but the hope in
Congress is that this action may occur in late August or early September.
The second resolution affirms or revises the matters contained in the
first resolution. It can direct the Appropriations Committees and other
committees with jurisdiction over budget authority or entitlements to
recommend changes in new or carry-over authority or entitlements.
Additionally, this resolution may direct the appropriate committees to
recommend changes in Federal revenues or in the public debt. In short,
if the new target does not agree with the one set in the Spring, Congress
has basically three alternatives: (1) increase taxes, (2) increase the
deficit, and/or (3) reduce spending.
k. Action Completed on Reconciliation Bill
Changes recommended by various committees, because of
discrepancies between the first and second resolution, are reported in a
reconciliation bill. Reconciliation may actually take the form of a bill
or another concurrent resolution. If appropriations, entitlements and
other budget authority legislation already have been enacted,
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reconciliation will be by means of a rescission bill. Because
reconciliation depends so heavily upon the directives provided in the
second resolution, little work can be done in advance. Enactment of
this bill must be completed by 25 September. Congress may not adjourn
sine die until it has completed action on the second budget resolution
and any required reconciliation.
This completes the Congressional budget process and sets
the stage for the new fiscal year to begin on 1 October. Congress may
not consider any further spending or revenue legislation which might
violate the specified levels just agreed upon. In other words,
supplemental appropriations bills may not be passed if they cause the
budget to exceed levels set by the second budget resolution, nor can
revenues be cut below the second resolution's totals. Of course,
Congress does have the prerogative to adopt a new budget resolution any
time during the fiscal year.
1. Timetable and Timing Problems
The schedule dipicted in Figure 3 was developed by
Congress itself, and it establishes a very rigid, yet flexible set of new
budget procedures. It is flexible because, although Congress wrote the
timetable into law, they were careful to provide a provision which
allows them to ignore their own deadlines, if necessary. The reason
behind such a rigid measure in the first place was to encourage an
orderly consideration of the budget. The conferees felt that it was
essential to set firm dates for key elements of the new process.
Failure to complete a particular event in the timetable
on time may affect later actions as well. Congress has established for
itself deadlines which may prove difficult to meet. As an example, the
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schedule puts the Budget Committees under a severe time constraint.
The timetable requires the committees to report their budget resolutions
to their respective Houses by 15 April. That allows only one month to
adopt the resolutions on the House and Senate floors, complete a
conference committee on the resolutions and approve the conference
resolution. The law requires a "lay-over" period in the House for 10
working days of that month to give House members sufficient time to study
the reported resolution. Also, as noted earlier, reconciliation actions
may not be initiated until action is complete on all appropriation bills
and the second budget resolution.
There are waiver provisions which were incorporated into
the law. However, even without those waivers, the House and Senate
through their normal operating procedures could decide to bypass the
budget timetable's requirements and operate under unanimous consent
agreements that suspend the rules.
There are many on Capitol Hill who do not expect Congress
to meet all of the established deadlines, especially the first time
around. Senator Muskie recently set forth his view that success of the
whole process would depend on how closely individual members and separate
committees were willing to discipline their actions to the budget
schedule. "If they ask for an extension here and an extension there, we
could end up with the whole timetable collapsing" [Ref. 7, p. 2416].
m. Summary
Thus, it becomes very clear that firm dates are needed as
guidelines, but much has been left to be worked out after some practical
experience is gained. The four main phases of the budget process
(authorizations, budget resolutions, spending measures, and reconciliations)
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must be completed by the dates assigned to them in the Act. However,
modifications are already contemplated as the "dry run" proceeds. It
could be said that while firm dates were set, there is nothing sacred
about them, and if circumstances dictate, they will be altered (with the
probable exception of 1 October) as necessary.
4. Title IV - Provisions to Improve Fiscal Procedures
a. Procedures for Backdoor Spending Legislation
In addition to the annual appropriation acts, there are
other "backdoor" obligations and expenditures. Sometimes they bypass
the Appropriations Committees altogether, and other times they limit the
discretion and control of these committees. There are three main forms
of "backdoors":
(1) Contract Authority . The statutory authority under
which contracts or other obligations may be entered into prior to an
appropriation.
(2) Borrowing Authority . The statutory authority that
allows a Federal agency tc incur obligations and to make payments for
specified purposes out of debt receipts.
(3) Mandatory Entitlements . The legal requirement to
make certain payments over which there is little or no control through
the appropriations process.
The Act defines these three authorities as spending
authority. It also refers to new spending authority as spending authority
not provided by law on the effective date (January 19 76) of Section 401
of the Act and subject to the new procedures.
The Act supplies special new procedures to the enactment
of contract and borrowing authority in order to promote better control

over spending actions. The new procedures, effective January 19 76,
provide that new contract and borrowing authority legislation must contain
a provision that such new authority is to be effective only to the
extent, or in such amounts, as are provided for in the language of the
appropriations act, itself. The effect of this provision is to change
new contract or borrowing authority into a routine authorization for
which funding must be secured through appropriations. It simply closes
the "backdoor" for this type of legislation unless it was effective prior
to January 1976. There are some exceptions, like Social Security trusts,
which are contained in Section 401(d) of the Act.
Concern over "backdoors" loomed early as an issue in the
development of the Act. It was the liberals who foresaw the danger of
revealing the total costs really hidden in these authorization bills.
It appears that their uneasiness was well warranted. An Issue Paper
prepared for the Subcommittees on HUD-Independent Agencies, Senate and
House Committees on Appropriations by GAO on 29 August 1975 [Ref. 56],
thrust this very issue into the limelight. The paper's topic was
budgetary, appropriations, and accounting procedures for the annual
contributions for assisted housing. It clearly shows that in recognizing
only the current portion (the normal practice) of the government's
commitment in the assisted housing program, only the tip of the iceberg
shows. The GAO paper concludes that the full amount of the government's
commitment should be recorded using the best estimate available and
periodically adjusting the data, as necessary. In this particular
example, depending upon the cost estimating method employed, the figures




million for total program runout cost. This is conservatively 25
times as great as shown annually. The problem lies in the fact that the
actual government commitment is not shown in the bill, when enacted,
and consequently, the total commitment is often overlooked. Several
other incrementally funded programs (Maritime and Federal Buildings) are
also discussed in this paper.
Thus , it is the open-ended entitlements which tend to
grow substantially over time. The foregoing example illustrates rather
clearly what can happen when a dollar limitation is not, or cannot be,
put on a program. A possible solution lies in the tightening-up of
annual appropriation bill language to restrict total spending amounts on
such programs.
With respect to the third "backdoor" (entitlement
authority), the Act provides that new entitlements may not be considered
by either House if it would have an effective date before the beginning
of the new fiscal year. As noted earlier, the purpose of this procedure
was to make entitlements fully subject to the Act's reconciliation
process in September.
The Act further requires the Appropriations Committees to
study existing spending authority laws and to report any recommendations
for revising or terminating them.
b. Deadline for Reporting Authorizing Legislation
May 15 was the date established as the deadline for
reporting authorizing legislation by House and Senate committees, but
HUD estimate based on their desired mix of contracts. The
President's budget contained an estimate of budget authority of $26,063.0
million. The difference is a result of the number of years a contract




waiver procedures are provided. The 15 May date can be waived by means
of a resolution reported by the Rules Committee in the House or the
Budget Committee in the Senate.
This deadline was one of the most controversial features
of the reform Act. Both 31 March and 30 June were considered, but 15
May was finally chosen as a compromise. It is expected that with the
advance (year-ahead) authorization procedure established in Title VI of
the Act, committees will be able to meet this reporting date without
much difficulty. Hearings will be initiated in the Fall to facilitate
the process.
c. Congressional Budget Office Analyses
The CBO will prepare five-year cost analyses of each
public bill reported by any Congressional committee other than the
Appropriations Committees. These analyses will be included in the
committee report if time permits.
This new provision was first established by the Senate
Government Operations Committee and later modified by the Rules and
Administration Committee. As initially set, it prohibited the
consideration of a bill unless the report contained a cost analysis
prepared by the CBO. However, this would have meant members and
Congressional committees would be dependent upon a separate Congressional
agency for the progress of their legislation. Thus, this requirement was
changed to make it operative only "to the extent practicable 1 ' and only if
the analysis is "timely submitted" to the reporting committee.
d. Jurisdiction of Appropriations Committees
The jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees was expanded to include the rescission of appropriations,
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contract and borrowing authority, and entitlement legislation referred
to them pursuant to Section 401(b).
e. Summary
Thus, this title effectively provides provisions for
improving the fiscal procedures. It essentially curtails new "backdoor"
spending legislation and extends jurisdiction of the Appropriations
Committees into these areas. Additionally, it provides a deadline for
reporting authorizing legislation and requires inclusion of five-year
cost analyses of all new legislation reported by committees.
5 . Title V - Change of Fiscal Year
a. Background
It is interesting to note that throughout our history the
fiscal year has been moved around to fit the needs of the day. For
instance until 1842, the Federal Government appropriated funds on a
calendar year basis. Actually, even within the time period 1792 to 1820,
Congress found it necessary to move its normal convening date from early
December back into October/November in order to enact a general
appropriations bill on time. However, by 1820, when faced with in-
creasingly complex appropriation bills, Congress resorted to partial
appropriation bills to provide interim financial support to agencies.
Even then department officials complained loudly that Congress failed to
pass appropriation bills on time, often being two to five months late.
To relieve this time pressure, Congress changed the fiscal year in 1842
from 1 January to 1 July. Unfortunately, as time has passed, Congress
is still running two to five months late and continuing resolutions have
become a semi-permanent fixture. In some instances, agencies have
operated for the entire year on a continuing resolution.
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Late enactment of appropriation bills in the past few
years has provided the stimulus for shifting the fiscal year ahead three
or six months. Hearings were held on this subject and received all
around favorable support, although a precise date was a bit difficult in
determining. Nevertheless, 1 October was decided upon as the date most
in accord with Congress' current work schedule and as the date most
likely not to disrupt the budget processes of State and local governments.
There was little doubt that the change was necessary to put an end to the
practice of continuing appropriations resolutions, but the only real
motivation was that it gave Congress three additional months during which
to complete its budget process. The change will take place in Fiscal
Year 1977; i.e., 1 October 1976.
b. Accounting Procedures
The actual shift will require a transition period of
three months - 1 July 19 76 through 30 September 19 76 - officially
designated as FY7T. To facilitate in the transition, the Act provides
that budget estimates will be submitted in such form and detail as is
determined by the President after consulting with the Appropriations
Committees. It also establishes expiration dates of authorizing legisla-
tion and directs 0MB to prepare any necessary implementing legislation.
Moreover, the Act directs 0MB and CBO to conduct joint studies on the
feasibility and advisability of advance or multi-year budgeting.
Although the studies will be done jointly, the two offices will report
separately to Congress.
c. Summary
In the long run, there should be very little difficulty in
making the fiscal year change-over . At the request of the President,
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Congress has provided a blanket extension
of all appropriations sohednled
to expire 30 June 1976 until 30
September 1976 (Public Law 93-554,
Section 20A) . Necessary appropriation
language for the transition has
been included in the Fiscal 1976
budget.
6. Title -VI - Amendments to t
b» «"H ee.t and Accountin^Act^Q921
a. General
4- =« r,f PT QV344. the President hadPrior to enactment ox i. L, ji jhh,
considerable latitude in formulating the
specific content of his budget
• • p Titin vj of the Act, however,
,
• • *-n rnn(jrpoo The provisions of Title i 01 u
^^<->
submission to Lo gresb. xnc ^t
amend the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921 to outline more specific
additional items of information that the
President must include in
subsequent budget submissions. While
some of these provisions result




significant problems and implications
for the President, 0MB and the
other Executive Department agencies.
Beyond the extra work required to
compile and submit the additional data,
some of the estimates and
presentations will be very difficult to
produce. Most importantly, the
President's management prerogatives will
become more restricted by
publicizing future initiatives and
divulging internal department planning
information.
b. Matters to be Included in
the President's Budget
The Act specifies six additional
matters to be included
in the President's budget submission
or in subsequest periodic updates.
(1) p^™^, for Items in the Bu^et_Resolution. The
annual budget will provide estimates
for the same items contained
in the
format of the Congressional budget
resolution (total new budget
authority and outlays; functional




total revenues and the public debt). This will require the President
to publicly outline his position regarding these budget items and
explicitly state his fiscal policies and budget priorities.
(2) Tax Expenditure Data . The budget will provide
itemized tax expenditure data and explain proposed changes. The 19 76
Budget included tax expenditure tables and analysis of this type for
the first time [Ref. 57].
(3) Variance Reports . The President's budget will
report and explain any variances during the past fiscal year between
actual revenues and uncontrollable outlays. In the past, revenues and
uncontrollable outlays have varied substantially from original estimates.
This revision is intended to encourage more accurate estimates and
requires that all deviations from initial estimates be analyzed and
explained.
(4) Budget Update s. The budget will be updated twice
a year by 10 April and 15 July with comprehensive listings of all
amendments and revisions proposed or accepted by the President subsequent
to initial submission. These updates are timed to coincide with
consideration of the first budget resolution and the period during
which floor action on various spending bills will be scheduled. The 15
July budget update and the President's mid-year review submission
required under provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,
as further amended by this Act, can be submitted concurrently.
(5) Advance Appropriations . The budget will contain
information regarding all programs for which appropriations have been
authorized to be made one year in advance cf the fiscal year in which




(6) National Needs . Beginning in Fiscal Year 19 79,
the budget will be presented in terms of a detailed structure of national
needs, agency missions and basic programs - a program-oriented budget
structure. The need for program information and a budget structure
which is more responsive to the needs of Congress was central to the
budget reform issue. In introducing the Senate version of the
Congressional Budget Control Act (S. 1414) on the Senate floor, Senator
Chiles (D-Fla) underscored this point:
Congress cannot practically set priorities
until we know the missions - and we cannot
know the missions until OMB presents its
budget in mission form [Ref. 66, PT. 1, p.
424].
This latter requirement is by far the most significant and
difficult matter of the six for consideration and implementation. It
concerns and depends upon the interrelated and complex problems of
developing standard program structures and an information classification
and coding system which will allow the entire Federal budget to be dis-
played, aggregated and translated into forms which can satisfy all
Congressional users. The development of a government-wide program
structure is a huge task that involves all of the Executive Department
agencies. Additionally, a single standard structure that will satisfy
all Congressional needs will be extremely difficult to develop and keep
current.
The President's budget has been presented on a functional
basis for a number of years. For example, the Fiscal 19 76 budget was
presented by functions (16 major) [Appendix G] , sub-functions (66) and
approximately 1300 appropriation and fund accounts [Ref. 57, p. 64-65].
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These functional categories, however, were not previously used by
Congress as a framework for making budget decisions. Historically,
and by their own choice, the Congressional budget process has involved
a series of separate decisions made with respect to individual
appropriations bills; therefore, the traditional mechanism for reviewing
and processing the budget has been the appropriation and fund account
structure. The Act now requires Congress to establish an estimate of
budget outlays and an appropriate level of new budget authority for each
of the major Federal functions. Thus, the use of the functional
categories has changed from one of merely displaying the budget to one
of providing a framework for making Congressional budget decisions.
This shift in emphasis has greatly increased the importance of the
functional category structure. It is essential that this structure
provide an effective framework within which the Congress can evaluate
competing national priorities and make its budget decisions. Interest-
ingly, many past Congressional efforts aimed at program reviews and
analyses have failed or have been severely limited by an inability to
readily and accurately translate, or "crosswalk," data from the
appropriation account structure to a functional or program-oriented
structure and vice-versa.
In 1965, President Johnson formally introduced the use
of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) techniques in the evaluation
of Federal programs throughout the Executive Branch. PPB was primarily
a management technique designed to enable decision makers to review
budget decisions within a program-oriented framework and more rationally
choose among competing program alternatives on the basis of cost-benefit
data. Subsequently, this experiment was abandoned in 1971 [Ref. 42, p. 8]
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Although PPB's record in the Executive Branch was at best mixed and
surrounded by controversy, it had little impact on Congress and the
legislative budget process. This was partially attributed to the fact
that the PPB system was limited internally to the Executive Branch and
that, throughout the six-year period, Congress continued to receive the
traditional (appropriations-oriented) budget-document information [Ref.
50, p. 475]. Others have argued that Congress purposely chose not to
embrace PPB and utilize its program-oriented data for the more funda-
mental reason that the PPB technique implied internal conflict and was
considered incompatible with committee norms (harmony and unity) and
the traditional decision making process of Congress [Ref. 28, p. 740].
Notwithstanding the past controversies over PPB, it would appear that
the new budget reform effort at least intends to more systematically and
comprehensively review programs and alternative means of achieving
program objectives through the use of a government-wide program
structure. To accomplish this, however, the budget data "crosswalk"
problem must be resolved.
The matter of developing a standard program-oriented
classification structure is a necessary and integral element of the
broader problem of identifying and specifying Congressional budget
information needs. Consequently, both problem areas must be solved
simultaneously. The matter of developing a Congressional budget
information system is the subject of Title VIII and will be discussed
further in that section.
The same basic source of budget information must now be
made adaptable to the requirements of several users. The Authorizing
Committees must be able to make budget recommendations to the Budget
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Committees; the CBO must be able to provide analyses of budget
alternatives and legislative "scorekeeping" reports; and the Budget
Committees must be able to formulate budget recommendations with
respect to both the budget totals and the distribution by function and
by committee jurisdiction. Thus, the functional structure developed
must not only meet the traditional needs of Congress (appropriations)
,
it must also provide information which is satisfactory to the new users
as well - or at least permit easy and accurate translation into a form
usable by these other users. To further complicate the matter, each of
the users require somewhat different information and levels of
aggregation at different stages throughout the decision making process.
Both aspects of the problem are presently being worked
on by GAO and CBO. The more immediate joint efforts are being driven
by a need to relate the Federal budget to the various authorizing statues
in order to make the budget more meaningful to the Authorizing Committees
and to facilitate fulfilling the CBO scorekeeping report requirement.
Long-range study efforts are underway to determine specific Congressional
budgetary information needs and to develop expanded coding systems that
provide a capability for aggregating budget information in various forms.
The program classification structuring system developed will be an
automated data system. It is hoped that the automated legislative
scorekeeping system and the classification structure system designed
will be compatible and use the same data base. A work group comprised
of staff representatives of the HBC and the SBC, House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, the
Senate Finance Committee, CBO, and GAO has been established to seek
agreement on the general requirements for the standard classification
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structure and the criteria to be used in developing the structure.
Other committee staffs and organizations including appropriate
Executive Branch agencies will be consulted in this study. The goal is
to obtain as much agreement as possible on the classification structure
and criteria for presenting the necessary information in order to have
a trial run for the 1978 Fiscal Year budget [Refs. 63 and 64].
While this is a monumental undertaking, these efforts
are being actively supported and are receiving the cooperation of
virtually all of the Congressional participants. As Congressional
solidarity has built, OMB has expressed more concern and interest in
becoming an active participant.
OSD and DON have expressed very little initial concern
with this matter. This is probably a result of two factors: first,
since this feature is not to be implemented until Fiscal Year 19 79, it
has been overshadowed by efforts to comply with the more immediate
provisions of the Act; second, compliance is not considered a
significant problem, since DOD already employs a mission/program
structure in its Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) . This latter view is
more prevalent, particularly at the working levels. The expected DOD
response would be to take an early initiative in the development of a
mission-oriented budget presentation which is acceptable to DOD rather
than to wait and have an externally devised structure arbitrarily
imposed. In any case, the matter will soon be under consideration by
the SBC Defense Task Force. They have undertaken the development of a






The date for the mid-year review required by the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 has changed from 1 June to 15
July and can be submitted concurrently with the President's 15 July
budget update. -
d. Five-Year Budget Projections
The President's budget will contain projections for four
years beyond the next fiscal year. This new provision is in addition to
existing requirements for projections such as five-year estimates for
new and expanded programs; five-year forecasts in the mid-year budget
review; and projections by Congressional committees.
This change is significant since it requires the President
to make public projections of the scope of future plans and programs.
Previously, this type information was utilized as internal planning
information subject to discretionary changes of management. For many
reasons j the Executive Branch may not desire to publicize this informa-
tion, particularly if it were required on a very detailed rather than
highly aggregated basis.
0MB guidance for preparation and submission of five-year
projections for inclusion in the Fiscal 19 76 budget required that these
projections be estimates of the spending implications of agencies'
Fiscal 19 76 budget submissions. Such estimates were to represent the
projected spending effect of policies and program levels proposed in
connection with the 19 76 budget. They were not to represent forecasts
of future budget levels nor assume discretionary program increases
beyond those specifically approved by the President for Fiscal 19 76.
All projections were in constant dollars at present day price levels and
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did not include allowances for future Federal pay raises. Agency
on-going programs whose authority expired during the forecast period
were to be projected at the budget year program level [Ref. 38].
The DOD submission was by major function at a very high
level of aggregation and did not require Service inputs. While the FYDP
served as a basis for the initial five-year submission to OMB, the
outyear projections were modified to exclude any discretionary program
increases. OMB's position is that the FYDP is not a good basis for the
five-year budget projections since, beyond the current budget year, it
includes new initiatives and planning levels that do change the scope
of various programs. Additionally, these outyear projections have not
undergone the rigor of a comprehensive budget review. However, DOD was
allowed a pricing exception by OMB for major construction, research and
development and procurement of major weapons systems and projected these
estimates at current (escalated) prices.
Several particular aspects of the OMB guidelines for
formulation and preparation of the five-year budget estimates require
further discussion. For the projections to realistically reflect future
spending and not convey a false impression of either dropping-off or
leveling-off over the ensuing five-year period, the estimates must assume
continuation of those programs of an on-going nature, include growth
allowances for certain beneficiary type programs (unemployment, medicare,
etc.) and provide price escalation for certain major, multi-year
purchase (capital investment) programs. The collective purpose of these
adjustments is to eliminate or lessen a phenomenon called the "waterfall 1,
effect. A large, portion of the DOD projections involves spending
programs which are considered on-going. For example, in the Tactical
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Air Program, it is assumed that existing aircraft inventories will
eventually be replaced with new, improved aircraft, and the basic
program will continue. To do otherwise would be unrealistic and might
signal a shift in national defense strategy. Also, DOD projections
include many spending programs for major multi-year purchases (weapons
systems procurement, R&D and construction) which involve both rapidly
changing technology and large capital investments. As evidenced by the
five-year defense estimates presented in the Fiscal 1976 budget (Figure
5), these adjustments result in substantial increases over the five-year
period. A comparison of the five-year estimates for the other functional
categories illustrates clearly the significance and vagaries of
applying the OMB projection guidelines.
The DON response to the five-year budget projection
requirement primarily has been to place greater emphasis on updating the
FYDP, developing the projections and ensuring budget/FYDP consistency.
e. Allowances for Supplemental and Uncontrollable Expendi-
tures
This provision requires the President to include an
estimate for supplemental appropriations and uncontrollable expenditures
in his budget submission. Its purpose is to provide Congress with a
more comprehensive and realistic estimate of budget requirements for the
ensuing fiscal year. While the Federal budget has previously included
an allowance for contingencies, it generally has been a token amount
($1 billion in Fiscal 1975), and has been inadequate to cover either
supplemental appropriations which have been averaging approximately $10




BUDGET AUTHORITY BY FUNCTION FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1976 ($billions)
DESCRIPTION 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Budget authority:
National defense 107.7 118.5 129.5 140.0 149.4
International affairs 12.6 8.9 8.9 8.5 8.1
General science, space,
and technology 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.7
Natural resources, envi-















Revenue sharing and general




receipts 20.2 -19.3 -20.1 -20.9 -21.6
11.9 7.5 6.9 6.7
2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9
14.1 14.5 14.6 14.8
5.4 5.1 5.3 5.3
13.7 13.7 13.7 13.8
35.3 41.5 47.2 52.5
174.9 188.7 202.5 215.0
3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4
3.6 3.7 4.1 4.3
7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7
38.5 38.5 38.7 38.6
13.8 16.9 20.1 23.2
Source: The Budget of the United States Government , 1976
FIGURE 5
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Total budget authority 385.8 452.1 480.7 512.7 541.4

In this regard, DOD would prefer to make "one-shot"
budget submissions with amendment and supplementals being the exception
rather than the rule. The Congressional budget process is so complex,
and the timetable so tight, that it would appear unwise to burden the
system with multiple submissions. Also, it will be difficult to protect
large contingent amounts in the Congressional concurrent resolution and
reconciliation process.
f. Current Services Budget
Submission of a current services budget by the President
on 10 November of each year is the first step in the new Congressional
budget process. This budget will estimate the budget authority and
outlays needed to carry on existing programs and activities for the next
fiscal year, assuming no policy changes but allowing for changes in
economic conditions. An amendment setting forth the concept of a current
services budget was first introduced by Senator Muskie. Its purposes
were previously discussed in Section 3.b of this Chapter.
The 10 November submission date is a modification of the
1 December deadline originally set by the Senate Government Operations
Committee in reporting the bill. At subsequent hearings on the subject,
former 0MB Director Roy Ash complained that the 1 December deadline
would interfere with preparation of the President's budget, and he
indicated that an earlier date might be preferable [Ref. 67, p. 74].
The 10 November date was chosen so as to occur after the end of the
preceding year and after Presidential and Congressional elections.
The Act does not require the current services budget to
be submitted in the same detail as the President's budget. Although
presented on a summary level, it must contain information by agency and
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be broken down to the major program level. The Act also requires
submission of supporting information, such as the rate of inflation,
the rate of real economic growth, the unemployment rate, program case-
loads and pay increases.
OMB guidance for preparation and submission of the 19 77
current services budget estimates states that it should reflect the
anticipated costs of on-going Federal programs and activities at 19 76
current services levels without considering policy changes (e.g.,
ignoring all pending legislative proposals, both Presidential and
Congressional). Estimates should allow only for the expected future
implications of current law and for anticipated changes of a relatively
uncontrollable nature. Permanent type programs whose authority is
scheduled to expire during the year should be assumed to continue.
Programs should not be adjusted for price increases beyond 1 September,
19 75, except to the extent required or specifically permitted by current
law. Major construction projects, such as the nuclear breeder reactor
and major weapons systems, should include an inflation factor only if
appropriations include amounts for future price increases. Other
programs should not be adjusted for inflation since this would require
a change in the existing law [Ref. 41].
It is expected that DOD current services budget estimates
will be submitted at a high level of aggregation and without individual
Service inputs. Initial DOD concerns with the current services budget
input are that it is to be submitted to OMB too early (15 September) and





This provision provides for future studies by the Budget
Committees of off-budget agencies whose activities and expenditures are
not presently included in the Federal budget (e.g., Export-Import Bank,
U.S. Railway Association, etc.). Although off-budget agencies are not
included in the budget, information and financial statements of these
activities previously have been included as annexes to the Federal
budget submission.
h. Advance Requests for Authorizations
This provision of the Act is one of a number of provisions
designed to encourage advance budgeting. It requires submission of
requests for new authorizing legislation no later than 15 May of the
calender year preceding the year in which the fiscal year to x^hich the
legislation applies will begin. Thus, by 15 May 19 76, the President
must request authorizations for the fiscal year beginning 1 October 1977.
Also, requests for new authorizations will be submitted for at least the
first two fiscal years. This provision was added in conference for the
purpose of enabling committees to complete the reporting of authorizing
bills by the 15 May deadline. Some individuals feel that the new
Congressional budget timetable will work only if Authorizing Committees
can develop procedures to consider advance authorizations for programs
now authorized on an annual or multi-year basis. In this regard, Title
V provides for CBO and OMB to jointly study the feasibility and
advisability of advance budgeting.
OMB guidance for preparation and submission of advance
authorizing legislation required that DOD's Fiscal 1976 and 1977 auth-
orization requests be submitted in the same bill, and that amounts
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requested should be eons is te„ t „lth the £lve.year projectlons .^^
in the Fiscal 1976 budget [Ref. 39 J.
Although DOD submitted Its Fiscal 1977 authorization
requests in early calendar year 1975, Congress has not been able to
review these requests pending completion of action on the Fiscal 1976
budget. It is anticipated that the Armed Services Committees will
eommence hearings on the Fiscal 1977 authorization requests in the Fall
of calendar year 1975. The initial submission required extra effort to
prepare authorization requests for two years. However, after the initial
transition period, the new procedure should not create any insurmountable
Problems other than those inherent in attempting to formulate and refine
program details aimost two years in advance. To this end, a tentative
accomodation has been made to permit updating of the ..year_ahead„
authorization requests twice during the review process. For example,
the Fiscal 1977 advance authorization request could be revised once
"ithin 15 days following comPl etion of Congressional action on the
Fiscal 19 76 appropriations requests and once following formulation of
the DOD Fiscal 1977 budget.
i» Summary
The provisions of this Title are primarily designed to
specify the content of the President's budget submission and provide
Congress with additional budgetary information. While considerable
effort is involved in producing the desired information, most individuals
are optimistic that they can satisfy each of the requirements. It is
still too early to assess the implications of the more significant




7. Title VII - Program Review and Evaluation
a. General
In the Federal government. Congressional responsibility
for legislation, appropriations, budgeting, oversight and investigations
requires the Congress to make its own appraisals of the effectiveness
of programs and to monitor evaluations made by the Executive Branch.
Title VII of the Act specifically gives formal expression to this
imperative responsibility by amending and expanding the Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 19 70 and by adding a requirement for
the Budget Committees to study, on a continuing basis, proposals to
improve Congressional budget-making.
b. Review and Evaluation by Congressional Committees
This section amends the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 to authorize committees to fulfill their oversight responsibil-
ities by contract or by requiring Federal agencies to conduct program
reviews and evaluations. The techniques to be used may include pilot
testing, cost-benefit analysis and periodic evaluations. This
amendment was proposed as a partial substitute for a more stringent
program evaluation feature originally reported by the Senate Government
Operations Committee in their version of the bill. The original
feature would have required pilot testing of all new major programs
prior to their implementation and would have mandated broad evaluation
and review duties for Congressional committees.
Senator Brock (R-Tenn) has been a strong proponent of an
expanded committee program evaluation role throughout enactment of
budget reform legislation. In an independent, in-house effort, Harrison
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appropriate jurisdiction from conducting their own K H
.„ ..
° °™ bu^get improvement
studies. Thls provision was originated „ fl181M as a ""or amendment by Senator
"~* to partially restore some of the more stringent committee review
7
6ValUati0n f~~*™ -om the senate version of
«» ** C-. 1541) by the Rules and Administration Committee.
One of the House Budget Committee's Task Forces hasheen established to review and oversee the budget process. This Task
-tee, chaired by Representative Brock Adams (D-„as h)
, u lmmedlatgly
concerned with implementation of the full k *budget process ln F . scal M77
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e. Summary
In setting national priorities ar>A , i •nd wcrkxng within self-imposed budget lim-if-c rm ts, Congress will need accul,te ^^ ^^
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about the cause-effect relationship between program results and
Congressional goals. Viable program review and evaluation will be a
necessary link in providing this feedback information to Congress.
Title VII provisions, while not an integral part of the new budget
process, should improve program review and evaluation efforts and there-
by assure more informed Congressional budget decisions.
8. Title VIII - Fiscal and Budgetary Information
a. General
Fully recognizing the fact that reliable and timely
information is a prerequisite for power, this Title of the Act amends
sections of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19 70 and adds one
additional provision to ensure an improved flow of budgetary information
that will satisfy the needs of Congress. The mere statement of these
particular provisions is far easier than the practical aspects of
implementing their intent. While the detailed work of designing and
developing a Congressional fiscal and budgetary information system is
rather mundane and tedious, albeit complex, the matters of content,
format and aggregation level become quite important and sensitive to
both the users and the providers. Consequently, these issues elicit
concern and recommendations from all levels. By its very nature, this
effort entails Government-wide participation and necessitates working
on a dynamic system which cannot be interrupted.
b. Budgetary and Program Data Systems
This Section amends the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 19 70 to provide for development of budgetary information systems,
standardized terminology, classifications and codes, and the availability
of information to Congress and State and local governments. The 1970
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Act originally charged the Department of the Treasury and OMB with
developing standard classifications in cooperation with GAO. The new
Act now vests lead authority in the Comptroller General (GAO) who, in
cooperation with the Treasury, OMB and CBO, will develop standard
terminology, definitions, classifications and codes for use by all
Federal agencies in supplying budget related data to Congress. The
impetus for this change is found in Congress' general dissatisfaction
with the past efforts of OMB and Treasury in implementing the 1970 Act
and further reflects their view that design and implementation of such
a system must be directed by its own agent (GAO) if the needs of
Congress are to be served in a timely manner. This shift in responsi-
bility was not without protest and question by the Executive Branch.
They expressed concern regarding the propriety of the Comptroller
General dictating budget terminology and classifications for the
President's budget submission and viewed such action as an encroachment
on the President's authority for determining the content of the Federal
budget as previously established in the Budget and Accounting Act of
,1921 [Ref. 67, p. 77]. In amending this Section, Congress, however,
recognized the President's prerogatives in formulating his budget and
did not prohibit the use of different classifications by the President
as long as the budget submission also contains the Congressional
classifications specified by the Comptroller General. In short, the
desired alternative would be for both GAO and OMB to jointly devise
standard budget classifications that would be satisfactory for the needs
of both the Executive Branca and Congress. Present efforts are
apparently following this course of action.
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Accordingly, GAO has expanded efforts in three inter-
related project categories: Congressional information needs, standard
classification structure, and monitoring recurring reports. An initial
step was to develop a proposed listing of approximately 90 standard
budgetary terms which is being circulated among various interested
committees and organizations for review and comments. From several
past studies of Congressional needs for information, GAO has identified
a requirement for three general types of information: (1) basic
financial information and impacts of Federal programs; (2) socio-economic
and national estimates (gross national product, cost-of-living indices,
etc.) indicating the impact of Federal fiscal policies; and (3) infor-
mation on revenues, outlays, domestic assistance programs and information
essential to assessing results related to States. Most importantly, they
identified the need for accumulating, summarizing and presenting
information on Federal programs according to classification structures
which reflect program objectives [Ref. 64, p. 3]. They have been doing
considerable work with both the Appropriations and Authorizing Committees
in defining their detailed informational needs. Both have widely varying
and specialized information requirements. The assistance provided to the
Authorizing Committees has primarily concentrated on defining and
developing their information requirements for preparing their 15 March
reports (views and estimates) to their respective Budget Committees.
Recently, GAO's information requirements work has been expanded to in-
clude the Budget and Government Operations Committees and the CBO. As
mentioned previously in Title VI, they are now jointly working with the
CBO on the long-term problem of developing a comprehensive Congressional
budget information system and the more, immediate problem of relating the
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In regard to the task of monitoring Congress' recurring
report requirements (approximately 750 reports), GAO has divided the
project into four areas: (1) compiling a computer-based inventory of
requirements for recurring reports; (2) publishing the initial
inventory; (3) monitoring new reporting requirements and changes to
maintain the inventory; and (4) evaluating reporting requirements. The
initial objective is to establish the complete and accurate computer-
based inventory of Congressional requirements for recurring reports by
30 June 1976 [Ref. 64, p. 25].
c. Changes in Functional Categories
This provision requires that the budget functional
categories [Appendix G] can be revised only after consultation with the
Budget and Appropriations Committees of both Houses. Since the Act
shifts the utility of the functional categories from mere informational
to decisional classifications, Congress now desires to control the
shaping of these categories. While this provision does not specifically
imply that the Executive Branch can no longer institute functional
category changes, the question may be academic since the earlier Title
amendment has granted the Comptroller General authority to establish
standard budget classifications and functional categories. Again, the
preferred or most effective course of action would be a joint GAO and
0MB change proposal to the four committees.
d. Summary
The most important single Government-wide report
submitted to Congress is the President's budget. If Congressional
budget reform is to ever be effective, Congress must have accurate and
timely budgetary and fiscal information and a facility for rapidly
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manipulating and analyzing such data. The Act has provided the
necessary mechanism to develop and maintain a comprehensive Congressional
budget information system. While the task is monumental and involves
many participants, sheer necessity apparently is forging unprecedented
Congressional staff cooperation and providing a stimulus for active
Executive Branch participation.
9. Title IX - Effective Dates and Miscellaneous Provisions
a. Miscellaneous Provisions
Under this Title, there are a number of miscellaneous
provisions which were necessary in order to make the Act compatible with
the way Congress operates. These necessary modifications can be viewed
broadly from both chambers.
(1) House Rules . Section 901 modifies the jurisdiction
of the House Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Government Operations
Committees to comply with the Act. It exempts the House Budget
Committee from oversight duties and from size limitations of its pro-
fessional and clerical staffs. The HBC, therefore, has the same status
as the Appropriations Committee and may hire, without special authori-
zation, staff personnel above the levels set in the House Rules.
Additionally, the HBC is authorized to meet when the House is in session
under the five-minute rule. And, finally, the Title permits the Budget
Committee to draw from the House contingency fund without an expense
resolution.
(2) Senate Rules . Similar modifications have been made
to the Senate Rules to adjust the jurisdictions of the Senate Finance
and Government Operations Committees to comply with the Act. Further-
more, in Section 903, two amendments authorize the Budget Committee to
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sit, without special leave, while the Senate is in session and exempt
it from oversight responsibilities given to other Senate committees.
b. Exercise of Rulemaking Authority
The provisions of this Title, pursuant to the Congress-
ional budget process, are enacted by Congress as an exercise of the
rulemaking power of both Houses and may be changed by either. Thus,
Title I's provisions, pertaining to the House and Senate Budget
Committees, may be changed by the affected House in accordance with the
correct procedures for changing its rules. In fact, both Houses altered
the sizes of their Budget Committees at the start of the 94th Congress.
Additionally, it permits the waiver or suspension of any provision of
Title III or IV by majority vote or unanimous consent of the Senate.
There is no similar provision in the Act for the House.
c. Effective Dates
A phased implementation schedule was also put forth in
this title (Figure 6). It provided for staggered implementation, rather
than one overall effective date for its provisions. However, in
considering the dates listed in Figure 6, one must be aware that the
optional implementation authority vested in the Budget Committees, under
Section 906 of this Title, provides broad control over the budget process
for the Fiscal Year 19 76. Optional implementation shall be "to the
extent and in the manner" prescribed upon agreement by the two Budget
Committees, and they also have the authority to adjust timetable dates
to facilitate the process. If, however, the Budget Committees decide
not to apply certain provisions of the Act to the 1976 Fiscal Year,
these aspects relating to the Congressional budget process will first
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Thus, Title IX sets forth a number of miscellaneous
provisions to facilitate overall acceptance and implementation of the
Budget Committees and new budget processes. Additionally, effective
dates are provided in a staggered manner with primary responsibility
for determining Fiscal 1976 optional implementation residing with the
two Budget Committees. All provisions of the new Act relating to the
Congressional budget process will be implemented for Fiscal 1977,
regardless.
10 . Title X - Impoundment Control
a. Background
This Section establishes a procedure for Congressional
review and control of impoundments and was considered by many as a
critical, companion feature of budget reform. One without the other
would have left Congress in an ineffective position. As stated by
Representative Boiling (D-Mo)
:
It makes no sense for Congress to establish new
procedures for the appropriation of funds if the
President can override the will of Congress by
means of impoundments [Ref. 59].
The basic issue surrounding all impoundments is the
failure of the President to spend funds appropriated by Congress. This
practice had been employed by Presidents for many decades; however, in
recent years, impoundments have become increasingly controversial
because funds have been withheld by Presidents solely to change the
programs and policies previously authorized by Congress. As discussed
in preceding paragraphs, this issue became crucial during the Nixon
Administration and was one of the primary coalescing forces behind
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Congressional budget reform legislation. President Nixon's unpre-
cedented impoundments and abrasive leadership style vis-a-vis the
Legislative Branch contributed to the feeling in Congress that he was
a definite threat to the traditional Congressional power of the purse
[Ref. 42, p. 17].
The major compromise arising from conference action on
the Act involved its impoundment features. The final version of the
Act took its form from earlier anti-impoundment bills of the two Houses.
The House version (H.R. 8480) was somewhat more permissive and would
have permitted the President to impound funds unless one House passed a
resolution requiring him to spend the funds. The Senate version (S.
373) was more restrictive and would have placed the presumption against
the impoundment. If the President did not want to spend appropriated
funds, he would have to request and obtain the approval of both Houses
to do so [Ref. 42, p. 14]
.
b. Disclaimer
At the core of the conflict has been the dispute over
the general authority of the Executive Branch to impound funds. This
Section was included for the purpose of disavowing any possible inter-
pretation of the new impoundment controls as constituting approval of
any past or future impoundments or the authority of the President to
impound funds.
c. Amendment to Antideficiency Act
This provision amends the Antideficiency Act to restrict
the purposes for which reserves may be established. Funds can be
withheld only for contingencies or for savings made possible by changed
requirements or improved efficiency. It removes the previous authority
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to establish reserves because of "other developments."
d. Repeal of Existing Law
This Section repealed the Federal Impoundment and
Reporting Act, Title IV of Public Law 92-599.
e. Rescission of Budget Authority
Rescissions must be proposed by the President whenever
he determines that: (1) all or part of any budget authority will not
be needed to carry out the full objectives of a particular program; (2)
budget authority should be rescinded for fiscal reasons; or (3) all or
part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year is to be
reserved from obligation for that year. In such instances, the
President must send a special message to Congress requesting rescission
of the budget authority, explaining fully the circumstances and reasons
for the proposed rescission. Affirmative action by Congress in the form
of an enacted rescission bill must be completed to rescind funds.
During consideration of the President's proposals, the Congress may
adjust amounts proposed for rescission. Unless both Houses complete
action on a rescission bill within 45 days of continuous session, the
President must release the funds for obligation.
f. Deferral of Budget Authority
Deferrals must be proposed by the President whenever any
Executive action or inaction effectively precludes the obligation or
expenditure of budget authority. In such cases, the President is to
submit a special message to the Congress recommending the deferral of
that budget authority. Either House may then pass an impoundment
resolution disapproving the deferral and requiring that the funds be
made available for obligation. The deferral Section contains no
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provision that allows Congress to adjust amounts deferred by the
President, nor does it place any time limitations on Congressional
action disapproving a reported deferral. If, however, no action is
taken by the Congress, the deferral may remain in effect until the end
of the fiscal year, unless the special message indicates that an earlier
release is planned.
g. Role of the Comptroller General
Rescission and deferral messages also are to be submitted
to the Comptroller General who must review each message and advise
Congress of the facts surrounding the action and its probable effects.
In the case of deferrals, he must state whether the deferral is in
accordance with existing statutory authority. The Comptroller General
is also required to report to Congress reserve or deferral actions
which have not been reported by the President; and to report and re-
classify any incorrect transmittals made by the President. If budget
authority is not made available for obligation by the President as
required by the impoundment control provisions, the Comptroller General
is authorized to bring a civil action to compel the release of improper-
ly impounded funds. However, such action may not be brought until 25
days after the Comptroller General has filed an explanatory statement
with the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.
h. Additional Reports
The President is required to transmit supplementary
messages to Congress whenever any information contained in a special
message request is revised. Also, he is required to submit monthly
cumulative reports of proposed rescissions, reservations and deferrals.
These reports will be published in the Federal Register and are expected
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to fully explain the factors that prompted the various impoundment
actions.
i. Executive Department Implementation
OMB has promulgated information on the provisions of
this Title and guidance for preparation of agency apportionment and
reapportionment requests [Ref. 40]. Both OMB and OSD representatives
have indicated that impoundments will have limited implications for
DOD and DON other than increased attention to necessary monitoring and
reporting requirements.
There was some initial concern that DOD reprogramming
actions might be subject to the provisions of this Title. The re-
programming procedure was formally recognized by the House Appropriations
Committee and written into the provisions of the DOD Fiscal 19 74
Appropriation Act (H.R. 11575). A similar provision was also written
into the DOD Fiscal 1975 Appropriations Act (H.R. 16243). This
procedure has evolved with the concurrence of the Appropriations and
Armed Services Committees of both Houses to allow DOD seme flexibility
when changing conditions indicate that funds should be allocated in a
manner other than as specified in the hearings and justifications. To
date, there has been no indication that Congress desires to change the
existing reprogramming procedure.
j . Summary
The provisions of this Title were designed to place
limitations on a President who continued to unilaterally abrogate the
Changes in the application of financial resources from the
purposes originally contemplated and budgeted for, testified to, and
described in the justifications submitted to Congressional committees in
support of budget requests. Funds are available for reallocation through




policy decisions of Congress and undermine the Congressional power of
the purse. With the passage of this Act, Congress has placed significant
constraints on the President's discretion and authority in managing the
Nation's economy. In retracting this measure of Presidential fiscal
authority, Congress has implicitly assumed a commensurate amount of
fiscal responsibility. The Act's budget reform procedures provide the
necessary framework for exercising this fiscal control if Congress is
willing to discipline itself for undertaking the task at hand.
While the Act does limit the President's discretion in
making decisions regarding the expenditure of Federal funds, its intent
can be circumvented in several ways if the President should so desire.
For example, he could flood Congress with rescission and deferral
messages; he could classify rescissions as deferrals or refuse to report
his actions; or he could use departmental administrative directives to
slow the implementation of various programs [Ref. 42, p. 18] . President
Ford has already been criticized for employing such tactics, particular
in his liberal use of deferrals [Ref. 37].
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT
1. The Horizontal View
The previous section presented a descriptive analysis of the
Act by employing its legal framework as an outline. This title-by-title
approach gave the reader a rather diverging, vertical explanation of the
Act's many provisions. This section provides a functional analysis or
horizontal view of the Act in order to more clearly interrelate the
duties and responsibilities of the various participants, to depict the




2. The Hill Troika/Inputs-Outputs
As a result of the Act, three new organizations were specifi-
cally created. Figure 7 depicts these organizations as the House and
Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office - the Hill
Troika. They were formulated to assist Congress in implementing the
Act's reform procedures. Their duties and functions are as follows:
a. CBO Duties:
(1) to act as Congress' primary source of information
on the budget and on taxing and spending legislation;
(2) to assume the duties of the Joint Committee on
Reduction of Federal Expenditures, particularly its scorekeeping
functions;
(3) to issue an Annual Report each year by 1 April to
the two Budget Committees. This report will provide analyses of various
budget levels in the aggregate as well as by major functional category;
(4) to assist the two Budget Committees, the Committees
on Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Finance, and all other
Committees and members, in that order, with budget related matters.
b. SBC Duties:
(1) by 15 April of each year, to report the first
concurrent resolution on the budget to the Senate;
(2) exclusive jurisdiction over any bill, resolution, or
amendment dealing with any matter covered by a concurrent resolution on
the budget;
(3) jurisdictional consideration with respect to waiver
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(4) to continue studies of the effect on budget outlays
of relevant existing and proposed legislation;
(5) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax
expenditures, to devise methods to coordinate tax expenditures,
policies, and programs with direct budget outlays, and to report the
results
;
(6) to review, on a continuing basis, CBO operations,
c. HBC Duties:
(1) by 15 April of each year, to report the first
concurrent resolution on the budget to the House;
(2) exclusive jurisdiction over any bill, resolution,
or amendment dealing with any matter covered by a concurrent resolution
on the budget;
(3) to continue studies of the effect on budget outlays
of relevant existing and proposed legislation;
(4) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax
expenditures, to devise methods to coordinate tax expenditures,
policies, and programs with direct budget outlays, and to report the
results;
(5) to review, on a continuing basis, CBO operations.
The duties and functions of the two Budget Committees
are very similar. The CBO, however, was created as a separate analytic
arm of Congress and, as such, serves the entire Congress with primary
responsibility to the two Budget Committees.
In addition to the Hill Troika, a number of other
organizations have prescribed responsibilities under the new law. For
example, the Act authorizes Congress greater access to agency budget
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information within the Executive Branch. New relationships and
communication channels will develop as this aspect of the law becomes
more fully understood. GAO will play a significantly important and
expanded role as it performs its program evaluation and feedback function
for Congress. Also, GAO has been given the lead responsibility for
developing a legislative budget classification structure system and for
conducting a continuous program to identify and specify the budgetary
information needs of Congress. The OTA and CRS will be called upon to
lend their respective technical and research expertise in assisting the
Hill Troika. Additionally, CBO is authorized to utilize outside infor-
mation sources, such as individual consultants or The Brookings
Institution, to assist them in carrying out their analytical duties.
And, finally, in view of the manner in which the new process was created
to overlay the traditional budget-making system, the Hill Troika must
forge close relationships with the existing standing committees and their
members to ensure compatibility in formulating the Congressional budget.
There are now a greater number of inputs and outputs
required because of the Act and its new organizations. A graphic
presentation of these additional inputs/outputs as they relate to the
three central instrumentalities can be observed in Figure 7. Basically,
the inputs are fed into the Troika as a whole. There the data is
digested, analyzed and displayed by the new organizations. Specifically,
the CBO is responsible for analyzing budget data. They then periodically
disseminate reports of various budget issues and alternatives within
Congress. Once a year (1 April), the CBO must publish the Annual Report,
which will be a compilation of those issues and budget alternatives
studied, displaying the information in the aggregate as well as by major
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functional category. The two Budget Committees receive all CBO
analyses plus additional views and recommendations from Congressional
committees regarding their future spending and revenue plans. The JEC
submits an economic evaluation based upon the President's current
services budget. The Budget Committees then formulate the first and
second concurrent budget resolutions from the mass of assimilated budget
information for presentation to their respective Houses,
d. Executive Branch Budget Data Requirements
Figure 8 enumerates the Executive Branch requirements for
complying with the provisions of the Act. The potential problems out-
lined are those considered particularly relevant for DOD and the Navy.
There are four major issues which the authors felt were of primary
concern: the current services budget estimates, the year-ahead requests
for authorization, the five-year budget projections and the question of
agency missions and programs. The Figure briefly notes the requirement,
its intended purpose, effective date, and the potential problems of each
of the four issues. An in-depth analysis of each of these matters can
be found in Section B. , 6. of this Chapter.
When discussing these various duties, relationships and
informational flows, several potentially important, unresolved issues
and problems become apparent. They are briefly listed here and will be
looked at in greater detail at the end of this Section (Implications
and Potential Problems):
(1) staffing and CBO employment
(2) improved information flow and disclosure
(3) sensitivities of legislative jurisdiction







cO U rH CO






















































o 3 -O bO
•u cO 3 G
e. > O cO 4-1
o 0) TJ ^ • U oH g cO CU •3 1
4-.'
•H ,a CU too 4-J
CO 4-J a) V-i 3 3
N bO CO •H o cu
•H •P cO M 3 H g
(-1 3 u CO & CO
o cu 3 CU CU CU CO
,3 •H o >^ r-J 4-J cu
4-J CJ o CO CO •
3 •H a S-i S-i 4-J CO CO
< <4-4 cu 3 CO •H cO 4-)
CW o CU rH o
cu 3 o m >> •H 13 CO
> CO 4-J o 3 p.H CD rH CO CO gO CO T3 ' (3 CO r-H H
3 r O o bO
• • QJ CO •H CO .. G o
0) 4-) <r i 4-> •H a) •H H
CO U £ o IW CO 4-) n
o •H CU d CU O CU o
P. g •H t- I-) 4-> P- toO ti
r-l e > t
:
o X u T3 o
3 o CU M CU 3 3 o








toO >^ 4-J a.
O 4-i p.
M CO >> CO
a-H 4-1
4-J •H g
13 cd rH o •
S-i CO •H r-l CO
cO rO 4-J 4-)
13 O < c
3 4J 3
CO ^
4-1 CU • rH CJ
CO r-l CO cO U
3 CO s cO
CU 4-) cu CO
rH O u co CO
toO 3 toO o 3
3 V4 3 f-l o
•H 4-J o u •H









t^ 3 g M
o o co 3
3 •H T3 u 4J
QJ CO 3 toO CJM CO CO .<







Figure 9 displays a time-phased comparison between the past
budget process and the new one. Of immediate interest, is the fact that
several actions in the new process take place well in advance of the
budget year shown. A full sixteen and one-half months prior to the
fiscal year considered (eight months before the President's budget
submission regarding it), the Administration must submit requests for
new authorizing legislation. As Figure 8 noted, there were two purposes
for this early action: to allow the Authorization Committees sufficient
time to meet their 15 May reporting deadline; and, to encourage advance
budgeting. Then in November, just two months before his annual budget
submission, the President must provide Congress with a current services
budget which projects programs ahead assuming all activities and programs
were continued at the same spending level as the year in progress. Its
purpose is to convey Executive agency budgeting data to the Congress at
an early date so that Congress may begin to analyze the information and
evaluate its economic impacts.
In addition to those activities requiring early initiation,
it should be noted that the annual budget timetable itself contains some
very restricting and critical deadlines. This is quite unlike the
traditional budget -making process which had no firmly fixed dates, but
instead, because of the fragmented manner in which the process was
carried out, often continued well into the new fiscal year, However, in
keeping with the new schedule, the Budget Committees must report the
first concurrent resolution on the budget to their respective Houses by
15 April. This allows one month for floor consideration and conference
action before the adoption deadline of 15 Kay. Also prior to 15 May,
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all new authorizing legislation must be reported. The purpose of this
requirement is to allow consideration of related programs in a single
measure. Thus, by 15 May the first budget resolution must be adopted.
Failure to do so would impact adversely upon time available for budget-
related legislation. Additionally, Congress may not consider revenue,
spending, entitlement, or debt legislation until adoption is completed.
This procedure sets budget "targets" in the aggregate as well as by
individual functional category, which are intended to guide Congress as
it enacts spending and revenue legislation through the Summer.
Section 307 of the Act forbids reporting of individual
appropriation bills until the House Appropriations Committee has, "to
the extent practicable," completed action on all regular bills. Although
this provision applies only to the HAC, it will undoubtedly affect Senate
action as well since the Senate must wait for the House to enact
appropriations bills prior to beginning its floor consideration. Regard-
less, action on all regular budget authority and entitlement bills must
be completed by the seventh day after Labor Day. This is a cruicial date
because only three weeks remain until the start of the new fiscal year
(1 October). It is during this short time period that Congress must
adopt a second budget resolution and undertake a reconciliation process,
if required. The second resolution sets a "ceiling" and theoretically
represents a last minute, fine-tuning of the budget to prevailing
economic conditions. Congress may use this resolution to direct
committees with jurisdiction over spending, revenue or debt legislation
to make any necessary "adjustments" to reconcile budget components with
totals agreed upon in the second resolution. Changes are reported to
Congress in a reconciliation bill. Congress may not adjourn for the year
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until it has acted on the reconciliation legislation.
4. Impressions and Attitudes Concerning the Success of the Reforms
Throughout the investigation, various impressions and general
attitudes regarding the Act and its chances of success were observed.
The most prevalent attitudes noted among the Congressional staff members
were optimism, confidence and resolve. Because Congress has publicly
committed themselves in support of the Act, most felt it would be made
to work. Also, the more senior members were encouraged by the high
level of committee staff support and cooperation that had been exhibited
thus far. CBO personnel were all very enthusiastic, candid and cordial.
The Budget Committee members were also very cooperative but somewhat
more cautious and guarded in their answers. The established standing
committee staff members expressed more reservations but were resolved
to make the process work. The OMB position was more skeptical, but they
were pleased to have the CBO available as a Hill focal point for all
budgetary matters. The D0D/D0N views were mixed. Some individuals were
less than optimistic and felt that the Act was just another government
procedural mutation that in the long run would not change the budget
process appreciably. Most felt that it would entail more work but were
optimistic that new requirements could be met. Most people thought that
it would be a definite improvement if it does succeed.
5. Implications and Potential Problems
a. Staffing and CBO Employment
Throughout the Fiscal 1976 "dry run" test period, the
Budget Committees and the CBO have spent considerable time and effort in
determining their staffing requirements and in recruiting highly
qualified people. Staffing a new type of organization "overnight" is
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always a difficult task; however, in this case, it was more difficult
since the staffs were expected to be serai-operational almost from their
inception and had little time to organize. The major consideration in
this circumstance was the rapid acquisition of a staff nucleus with past
experience and .varied backgrounds in public policy analysis and Federal
budgetary matters. To a large degree, people with these particular
analytical skills, backgrounds and knowledge of how Federal programs
and the budget process work were obtained from Executive Department
agencies. In establishing an unbiased, analytical arm for Congress, it
is rather paradoxical that it would be necessary to hire the initial
staff cadre away from the Executive Branch. However, as exemplified by
the comments of one senior staff member, "It is very difficult to find
people with good defense backgrounds without going to DOD." Appendix
F depicts the background of the defense/national security segments of
the CBO and Budget Committee Staffs visited. With the exception of
the CBO National Security and International Affairs Division, former
Executive agency employees predominate the initial staffing. The hiring
policy of the CBO National Security and International Affiars Division
was planned to emphasize academic brilliance rather than past experience,
In the long term, the CBO plans to achieve over-all staff depth and
balance by hiring from three main sources: (1) Executive agencies, (2)
independent research organizations, and (3) the academic community.
Their hiring efforts are still underway.
One might speculate that these individuals' past,
personal acquaintances and associations would serve to ease the problems
of establishing friendly and informal working relations with the various
Executive agencies. Also, they should better understand the internal
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workings of the agencies and know just what kinds of budget and cost
data might be available. This latter point, however, could work to the
advantage or disadvantage of an agency. At any rate, the personal
relationships should lessen the potential for any adversary tendency to
develop. Several people expressed concern over the possible "incestuous"
nature of such inter-department hiring practices and the overly amenable
relationships that may develop between career staff specialists. They
view this as a real danger which should be guarded against throughout
the bureaucracy.
Several other organizational problems still facing the
CBO involve definition of staff size and staff employment. The problem
of deciding staff size will culminate in the Fall of 1975 when the CBO
must submit a request for staff funding to the House Appropriations
Committee. There are some members of Congress already criticizing the
259-member CBO staff that Dr. Rivlin has proposed for being too large
and costly. Also, they feel there is too much duplication between the
staffs of the CBO and the Budget Committees. Additionally, there is
some difference of opinion concerning the scope of the CBO's work.
There is pressure developing within Congress for the CBO to perform
oversight work and conduct complete field investigations of each
Government agency every five years [Ref. 53, p. 1928]. Dr. Rivlin'
s
present position, however, is that the CBO does not have the necessary
staff depth to be conducting program evaluations [Ref. 53, p. 1928],
The level of staff funding finally approved may provide some indication
as to how strongly Congress will support the CBO in other matters.
121

b. Improved Information Flew and Disclosure
One of the major objectives of the Act was to provide
Congress with improved information to facilitate the budget review and
decision making processes. Additional data is to be submitted and an
independent analytical capability has been established. Also, the Act
authorizes the two Budget Committees and the CBO to obtain essential
data and technical assistance from Executive Department agencies as may
be necessary to aid Congress in making budget decisions. The Act
appears to provide a better means for Congress to deal with the technical
and confidential aspects which are inherent in many of DOD's budget
issues
.
The Budget Committees and the CBO were both questioned as
to how they intended to validate budget information and ensure its
accuracy. More specifically, they were asked to outline their criteria
for judging the quality of the budget and cost data submitted. A
synthesis of the various answers received from staff members follows.
First, in staffing most of these new offices, a great
deal of emphasis was placed upon prior experience. Particularly in
regard to defense issues and policy, it was evident very early that those
possessing the requisite knowledge and skills would have to be recruited
from within DOD itself. Therefore, there exists a large body of
expertise which may serve as a validation check on defense related data
subsequently received. The validation process will be done at every
level and rely to a large degree on the vigilance of these "experts."
The prevailing feeling was that these three new organizations - the Hill
Troika - would evolve a formidable body of intelligence, experience and
political savoir-faire required to ensure receipt of proper data.
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In keeping with this approach, most of those inter-
viewed suggested that there would be no formal, written criteria per se .
Validation would be accomplished through existing contacts and relation-
ships and would be based on trust and honesty. However, most were quick
to point out that if these sources were to "dry up," there were many
other external sources which could be tapped; for example, Brookings,
Rand, universities, or local dissident groups. While all confided that
independent studies by recognized "think tanks" and similar creditable
institutions would be used routinely, most hoped that the use of
"snipers" could be avoided.
Probably the greatest concern among all those interviewed
was that the Hill Troika might isolate themselves and eventually lose
touch with the reality of the problems.
From the DOD perspective, the new process is seen not
only as requiring additional information, but also as a strong force for
initially creating an additional level of detailed defense program
analysis, particularly one that may tend to become overly involved in the
internal working of the DOD budget decision making processes. However,
there is a feeling that as the CBO's analytical capability develops,
future Congressional budget debates will focus more on long-range issues.
In this regard, a debate on long-range national issues may better serve
the design of the legislative process by permitting Congress more time
in which to react, assess the political climate and make necessary
accommodations
.
The matter of open access to internal Executive agencies'
planning and budgeting information is significant and extremely
sensitive. While the Act provides rather broad authority for the CEO

to secure necessary information from Executive agencies, this authority
has not been envoked, explicitly defined, or flaunted. Apparently,
with time on their side, the CBO will initially employ a less demanding
approach and pursue the informal and amicable route. Hopefully, this
approach, coupled with the threat of the alternative, will elicit a
spirit of cooperation and result in the willing disclosure of necessary
data without forcing the issue. At this time, the full disclosure issue
remains largely unresolved and a potential source of future conflict.
c. Sensitivities of Legislative Jurisdiction
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 deals with the internal Congressional budget process in a more
sophisticated manner than any of the previous attempts to implement
budget reforms and to develop a legislative budget. The new budget
procedures were carefully designed to not offend the traditional power
centers of Congress and to complement the traditional budget review
and decision making processes. The Budget Committees were established
to overlay the traditional committee structure, and their duties were
defined not to threaten or encroach upon established jurisdictions [Ref.
42, p. 17]. Despite this care, the potential for jurisdictional
problems still exists. The Budget Committees and the CBO have been very
cautious throughout this "dry run" test period to avoid jurisdictional
disputes or confrontations which might jeopardize the entire process.
One of the highest priority objectives of the CBO staff is the building
of a good rapport and reputation with the standing committees of Congress
These sensitivities emerge in rather subtle or unexpected
ways. One example surfaced in considering design formats for Congress-
ional budget information reports. In this particular instance, the
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format was to display "tiered" cost build-ups of budget estimates with
one separate "tier" or cost element depicting an inflation increment.
The Appropriations Committees were not expected to like such a format
since it would clearly make the effects of inflation apparent to all
members of Congress and would indicate how the Appropriations Committees
subsequently allocated these allowances to the various appropriations.
The implication would be that they considered the allocation of inflation
effects among the various appropriations to be a matter within their
purview, and to make such information general knowledge would infringe
upon or lessen their discretion in making future allocations. Whether
or not such a format was adopted is unknown.
When questioned regarding potential jurisdictional
problems, the Armed Services Committees felt that the Budget Committees
were more apt to transgress into the Appropriations Committees'
established jurisdiction rather than their own. They were quick to
point out that Senate Budget Committee Chairman Muskie's floor stand to
influence Senate rejection of the Fiscal 1976 Defense Weapons Procure-
ment Authorization Bill was not a jurisdictional dispute. In this
particular case, Senator Muskie was enforcing fiscal restraints that
were c] early his duty to enforce.
Those committee staff members interviewed did not foresee
any significant Congressional power struggles resulting from the Act's
reforms. Some power (unspecified) may shift as the process evolves;
however, they view this shift as "nonzero-sum" in nature since, in
effect, the committees will be sharing an expanded Congressional power-
base that was derived at the expense of the Executive Branch.
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d. Congressional Decision Making Processes
One of the Act's major objectives is to improve Congress 1
budget review and decision making capabilities. At this juncture, it
is too early to discern any major changes or new trends in Congressional
budget decision- making patterns. However, the Act has already changed
or affected several of Congress 1 traditional outlooks and ways of doing
business.
One significant change is found in Congress 1 resolve to
undertake a process which implicitly involves many of the fundamental
features of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) approach to
management and decision making. For the past decade, Congress has re-
jected the PPB approach on the basis that is was incompatible with their
way of operating. In short, PPB implied making hard comparative choices
and selecting certain policies from among alternatives. Such an approach
implied internal conflict, a development Congressional committees had
long tried to avoid [Ref. 28, p. 740]. What new development or change
now allows the successful introduction of the PPB approach into the
political decision making process of Congress?
Fundamentally, no one views PPB as a system which, in
itself, makes decisions. Rather, it is a technique which should be
employed as a tool to assist responsible officials in making more
rational decisions. There is little argument that the Act's new
procedures are different in some respects from the traditional manner in
which Congress has operated. The basic change regarding the present
Congressional adaptation of PPB techniques is really found in the
underlying concept of the current budget reform being viewed as a true
legislative initiative. Simply, it was designed by Congress to fit
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their needs, so it is now basically acceptable. Viewed in this frame
of reference, the Act's PPB-oriented features are a hybrid procedure
designed to meet Congress' particular requirements and to operate in
their own institutional environment. However, the PPB system and its
associated analytical aids still should not be thought of in terms of
a replacement for the traditional Congressional decision making process,
but as another technique which can be employed within the context of
the new budgeting process.
One staff member, who participated in the budget reform
working group, roughly correlated the Planning, Programming and Budget-
ing functions with the Budget Resolution, Authorization and Appropria-
tions phases of the Congressional budget process. The two Budget
Resolution phases provide the planning function through consideration
of alternatives, the review of aggregate spending levels and the
establishment of fiscal restraints. The Authorizing phase provides the
programming function by permitting the systematic review and approval
of various Federal programs and program levels. The Appropriations
phase finally translates the approved budget programs into annual
funding levels. He foresaw three possible problems in attempting to
make, the PPB-oriented system work in the Congressional decision making
environment. First, it might take some time for individual members to
adjust to their new dual budget review roles. In a real sense, the
new process requires each member to simultaneously concentrate on
specific details of programs while keeping the broader fiscal issues in
sight as the budget review process and emphasis shift from one phase to
another. Second, the classical PPB system assumes a hierarchical or-
ganizational structure with decision making being centralized in a chief
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executive. In this regard, the fragmented design of the Congressional
decision making process may not accommodate such an approach. Third,
and most important, annual time constraints may not allow sufficient
time for the necessary review iterations to take place. In the poli-
tical environment, the decision process must allow enough time for
various constituent groups to provide inputs, maneuver and compromise.
An additional change is also noted in the traditional
interchamber compromise mechanism - the conference report. Once
reported, these compromise positions are normally accepted by both
Houses. However, the various conferences must now consider a third
factor in their deliberations - their appropriate joint budget
resolution targets. Some feel that the joint resolution targets in
many ways limit, restrict or invalidate the subsequent compromise
discretion of the individual Conference Committees. Theoretically, both
Houses and the Conference Committee should observe the same joint
resolution target set in the Spring.
The Senate debate over the Fiscal 1976 Defense Weapons
Procurement Conference Bill perhaps most clearly demonstrates that the
Act has brought about a change to this traditional decision making
feature. As one Senate. Budget Committee aide summed it up:
S tennis was saying basically, 'Look, the Senate
bill was lower than the House bill, it went to
conference, we (the Senate conferees) fought hard,
we split the difference, and that's what the process
is all about. ' Muskie was saying, 'No, the process
has been revised, the limits that were enacted in
May are enforced both for the House and Senate '
[Ref. 53, p. 1925] .
Another provision of the Act which may impact on the
traditional Congressional decision making process is tbe public dis-
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closure feature. Once Congress (or a member) has gone on record in
the Spring for certain spending levels and programs, it will be more
difficult to change or modify future positions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. GENERAL
This research effort was principally directed toward an investi-
gation of the new budget reform process and its attendant supporting
organizations. In this manner, valuable insights, perceptions and
implications were gleaned which will aid the defense establishment in
reacting positively to this new set of budgetary requirements.
B. SYNOPSIS
A brief synopsis of the authors' findings related directly to the
specific issues and questions posed in Chapter II follows.
1 . Catalysts of Budget Reform
The immediate catalyst for enactment of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was the Nixon Administration
and, specifically, the President himself. While reform had been
attempted in the past, it was Nixon's brand of leadership and his
relationship with Congress that precipitated this particular reform
effort. His leadership was marred by a breakdown of comity between the
Presidency and Congress, and his relationship with the Congress was one
of confrontation rather than accommodation. The manner in which he
impounded funds only served to aggravate an already strained situation.
The escalation of Nixon impoundment actions and OMB' s formidable power
presented Congress with a very serious threat to its constitutional




Since 1921, the President has dictated the content of his
budget. Congress, in its fragmented approach, could offer no organized
resistance. However, the Act has given Congress the mechanism to re-
gain its alledged lost power of the purse. While a degree of antagonism
between the two Branches of Government has always existed, the intro-
duction of new budget reform procedures will inevitably spark future
conflicts.
It is still unclear as to what degree of Executive Department
budgeting information will be requested by Congress. One can expect
that if sensitive, internal information is required, the Administration
will not want to reveal its plans regarding future initiatives. On the
other hand, Congress not only has a legal right to this data, but if
the United States is to solve some of its deep-rooted fiscal problems,
it may have a moral right as well. Since implementation of the Act,
information has been requested on an informal and friendly basis;
however, the threat of a formal request or demand for additional,
detailed information is a distinct possibility.
The current services budget offers a prime example of how
contrary views can lead to possible conflict. Congress had hoped that
the current services budget would simply be mathematical projections of
spending and revenues, without political judgments. On the other hand,
OMB said that the best they could do was to identify a range of spending
that might be required to maintain the present fiscal programs through
the next fiscal year. Because of the complexity of the Federal budget,
making projections from the present year to the next can be, at best,
little more than an educated guess and, at worst, may be subject to
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political manipulation. Regardless, the current services budget is
sure to become one of the most controversial items in the entire
budget making process, and yet it will be one of the most unique and
sought after documents.
As an update, the Department of Defense submitted its current
services estimates for Fiscal 19 77 to OMB on 22 September 1975, well in
advance of Congress 1 10 November submission deadline. The accompanying
cover letter, signed by James R. Schlesinger, noted that Congress had
not acted upon the Defense's Fiscal 1976 budget requests, except for
rejecting its Weapons Procurement Authorization Bill, and implied that
in this light, submission of current service estimates would mean little.
The estimates given were, in fact, highly aggregated.
3 • Int ra-Congressional Conflicts
Creation of the three new Congressional budget processing
organizations - the Hill Troika - was carefully structured to avoid
threatening established committee jurisdictions. In this regard, the
tack taken thus far by the three new entities has been one of non-
abrasiveness. This has been particularly true with the CBO and the
House Budget Committee. The Senate Budget Committee, on the other hand,
under the leadership of Chairman Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me) , has been much
more prone to flex its new muscles. Senator Muskie, however, has
been very careful to stay well within his legal mandate, doing only
what the Act prescribed.
The above notwithstanding, a potential conflict does exist.
The major unresolved problem stems from the varied interpretations of
the Budget Committees' jurisdiction. The two opposing views are: (1)
jurisdiction is limited strictly to those, items assigned in the Act; and
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(2) jurisdiction extends to all budget related matters not strictly
within another committee's purview.
The undeniable fact is that the Hill Troika represents yet
another layer of bureaucracy. Three more organizations are now looking
for a niche and. a piece of the "action." In short, the new committees
have very little to lose, while the established committees possibly
stand to lose more.
4. Congressional Decision Making Process
The Act provides for establishment of an institutional and
procedural framework from which Congress can give more orderly and
informed attention to each Federal budget submission. However, the new
budgetary framework will work only if Congress wants it to work. The
Act also provides the mechanism to assist Congress in changing its
decision making process, if it so desires.
The most fundamental stumbling block to Congressional budget
reform may be Congress itself. Congress is almost 200 years old. It
has generated considerable momentum and developed many habits during
those 200 years. As a legislative institution, it represents many
different areas, groups and needs, and has historically reached decisions
through an incremental approach. Five hundred thirty-five Congressmen
must now make the same kind of politically, sensitive judgments as to
which parts of the budget to increase or decrease that one highly
centralized Executive agency, 0MB, presently makes while preparing the
President's budget. Whatever the overriding merits of responsible
fiscal policy, Congress and its members must also respond to other
imperatives, such as political pressures or constituency desires.
133

In attempting to modify the process of enacting a Federal
budget into a rational whole, one must expect Congressional decision
making to change. Regardless, whether the reform efforts succeed or
fail, the traditional legislative process has already been changed and
it will take several years for the Congressional decision making
mechanism to adjust. Thus, to what degree the process will be modified
must remain mostly unanswered until the complicated procedure becomes
fully effective for a period of time. As an update, it appears that
things may indeed be changing. At least, there is a different way of
doing business. Witness the significant influence that Senator Muskie
(D-Me) and his Senate Budget Committee have had in keeping the lid on
the Fiscal 19 76 budget.
5. Improved Budgetary Information
If Congress is to succeed in its budget reform efforts, it
must be provided accurate and meaningful information. The Act provides
Congress with a separate analytical arm to collect, analyze and display
budget information in various formats. The Congressional Budget Office
appears well on its way to establishing itself as a highly competent
and professional organization capable of carrying out its tasks. The
CBO has at its disposal the necessary tools to ensure that all vital data
is obtained and utilized. Additionally, it is keenly aware of the
many pitfalls on Capitol Hill, such as advocacy, and is resolved to
avoid them.
6. Setting National Priorities
The setting of national priorities is a procedure which is
inherent to the overall budget making process itself. There are a
couple of things which cast a new light on the subject of priorities.
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First, the Act establishes procedures which allow Congress to discuss
and debate the budget early in the review cycle. Secondly, during the
same time frame, Congress is afforded the opportunity to view the
budget in its entirety. Thirdly, Congress has the capability through
the CBO to look at various alternatives and their economic impacts. It
is during this period that the Budget Committees recommend functional
category targets which in effect represent the budgeting priorities as
they see them. The targets Congress decides upon are simply that, and
as such, may be modified for any number of reasons as the process pro-
gresses through the appropriations phase. Thus, Congress debates the
entire budget early, is able, with the aid of the scorekeeping function,
to track its progress throughout the Summer months, and finally gets a
last chance to discuss and vote on its total size and composition
before final enactment. The Act sets up program evaluation provisions
which will provide Congress with accurate and timely feedback regarding
the cause-effect relationship between program results and Congressional
goals. This feedback provides a necessary link in considering budget
alternatives and competing national priorities.
In the final analysis, national priorities are determined
through Congressional give-and-take, which results in appropriations
bills. The Act simply underscores its importance and provides additional
provisions to permit Congressional control. Ultimately, national
priorities are little more than a synthesis of Congressional political
judgments.
7. Timetable and Timing
Firm dates were prescribed in the Act to encourage an orderly
consideration of the budget. Failure to complete action of a particular
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event for any reason may well affect latter actions, although Congress
does have the option to waive any deadline.
Of primary concern was whether there would be sufficient time
to allow the iterative- type process deemed so necessary. In other words,
all parties must be afforded the opportunity to provide inputs, receive
feedback, and respond again as many times as necessary to reach a
concensus decision.
The majority believed that the timetable is too rigid and
appropriate modifications will be required as experience is gained.
8. Success or Failure
It is much too early to answer unequivocally that the new
budget reform will succeed or fail. However, the longer it lasts, the
better are its chances of survival and success. Below are listed key
factors in predicting its success or failure, as perceived by the
authors.
a. Factors Pointing to Success
(1) Three new organizations (House and Senate Budget
Committees and the Congressional Budget Office) to assist in implementa-
tion.
(2) High quality of staff personnel in these three new
entities.
(3) Strong support and enthusiasm among Congressional
members and staff personnel.
(A) Congressional leadership, unlike in past reform
efforts, has an opportunity to play a significant and expanded role
throughout the budget process.
(5) Earlier reform experiences. Somewhat related to
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the preceding item, the present reform effort has profited from past
failures and has been more carefully formulated to elicit broad
Congressional support.
(6) Unprecedented amount of publicly announced support
from Congress and its individual members will help to make it work.
(7) Trail run for FY76 has been a good exercise. It
has given the Budget Committees and CBO an opportunity to organize and
gain experience, while assessing strengths and weaknesses.
(8) Time has allowed both Houses to identify and correct
procedural problems.
(9) Outward support from the Administration.
(10) True legislative reform effort has resulted in a
loose alliance of senior committee staff members who are resolved to
make the process work.
(11) Open nature of the budget review and debate process.
b. Problem Areas
(1) Public pressures. The open nature of the reviev;
process, particularly the advance budget position feature inherent in
the First Budget Resolution, may subject Congress to undue public
pressure for or against future revisions. Once Congress (or a member)
has adopted a position, pressure could be exerted for a future change;
or conversely, Congress may hesitate to change an adopted position for
fear of public criticism. Such pressures could further complicate the
decision process.
(2) Unresolved intra-Congressional problems.
(3) Traditional fiefdom nature of Congress,
(4) Current; national economic conditions.
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(5) Cumbersome layer of bureaucracy.
(6) Executive sensitivity to divulging future initiatives,
(7) Criticality of timing causes real concern in carry-
ing out the complete budget review process. The problem arises in
allowing the process sufficient time and latitude to shift back and
forth between macro and micro considerations. This vital iterative
cycle must be afforded wide representation to ensure all constituents
and interest groups are allowed to make their inputs. A power struggle
of any type would debilitate and probably wreck the entire process.
With the passage of the Act, Congress provided the legal
framework to regain its intended role in the budget making process.
However, with this transfer of power goes a commensurate amount of
fiscal responsibility. The power can be reinstated easily, but the
fiscal responsibility can only be brought back slowly by Congressional
members themselves. To recapture this quality, the members must be
willing to hold themselves to the new procedures and rebuild fiscal
discipline. This resurgence may take several years.
It is evident that a number of the outlined strengths
and weaknesses may play a role in determining whether the process is a
success or a failure. Two messages, however, have been made clear:
(1) Congress is resolved to implement these needed budget reforms, and
(2) their collective prestige has definitely been publicly exposed.
It appears that the real test will come in the Spring of 1976 when, by
15 May, the disparate views of all members of Congress must be shaped
into a single statement of budget goals stating targets for individual
programs for the Fiscal 1977 budget. As succinctly expressed by one
senior staff member, "It is a process which can't work, but it has to."
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9. Implications and Problems for POD and Navy
Clearly this budget reform brings with it an expanded
Congressional effort in scrutinizing the Department of Defense budget.
Defense can expect to deal with yet another layer of bureaucracy.
Additional relationships and communications channels will have to be
developed to handle inquiries generated by the new organizations. The
Act also confers broad authority on the CBO for obtaining necessary
budget information from Executive agencies. Further, the law provides
Congress with the mechanism to deal better with both the technological
and confidential aspects inherent in many DOD budget issues. These two
areas have often hampered Congressional inquiry in the past. How much
information Congress will want or to what level of detail they will
delve is still unknown, but it is evident that all these additional
demands will result in a greater workload for DOD and the Navy.
Congress' request for five-year projections of DOD budget
authority and outlays could carry severe implications for both DOD and
Navy. If the data required is to reflect aggregates and totals, there
probably will be relatively little objection. However, if detailed
"line-item" data similar to that contained in the DOD and/or Navy FYDP
is requested, then there will be problems and plenty of objections
since this information, in its present form, was intended only for DOD
internal planning and decision making purposes. The authors' conclusion
is that eventually Congress will want FYDP type data.
After 1 October 19 79, the Executive budget must contain "a
detailed structure of national needs which shall be used to reference
all agency missions and programs." The Senate Budget Committee Defense
Task Force has already taken this project under consideration. It is the
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opinion of the authors that DOD should take an early, active interest
in this matter to ensure that the DOD program structure devised is one
that is compatible and acceptable to DOD.
Change of the fiscal year from 1 July to 1 October, through
the use of a three-month transition period (FY7T), should pose few long-
range problems for DOD/Navy. In the short-run, it will cause a number
of headaches, not the least of which is changing the accounting and
reporting systems. It is understood that FY7T will be treated as a
regular fiscal year; therefore, all accounts will have to be closed
out, all funds alloted, etc., exactly as if a 12-month fiscal year had
passed. This short, "extra" accounting year will create an additional
workload.
An area of major implication for DOD/Navy is the fact that
henceforth Defense will be treated equally with the other 15 functional
categories like Health and Agriculture. Although several people on
Capitol Hill felt that Defense should be treated separately, the majority
saw Defense as simply another category fighting for its share. The
Defense establishment has recognized that they are now competing in a
new arena with other functions which command strong Congressional
support. The traditional manner of relying almost exclusively on the
House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to
determine the Defense budget may no longer be a completely valid approach,
A major DOD concern is that Congressional budget actions may
transmit incorrect signals regarding our defesne posture to the rest of
the world. At a press conference late in October 1975, Secretary
Schlesinger blasted the House for "deep, savage and arbitary cuts" in the
defense budget. News media reported that this outburst was prompted by
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Dr. Schlesinger's fear that the new budget process poses a long-term
threat to the Pentagon. Insiders said that Schlesinger believed the
dynamics within the Congress had changed dramatically since last year,
primarily because of the new budget reform effort [Ref. 30]
.
Many believed the Defense Secretary made a grave error in
openly attacking DOD's long-time friend, George Mahon (D-Tex) , and his
House Appropriations panel.
A very short time later, 2 November 1975, Dr. Schlesinger was
removed from the Secretary of Defense position by President Ford.
Ostensibly, Ford relieved Schlesinger because he wanted his "own man"
in that job; however, many recalled in April 19 74 when the then Vice-
President Ford criticized Schlesinger for not knowing how to deal with
Congress [Ref. 18].
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The effort undertaken in this thesis represents but an initial step
toward understanding and assessing the implications of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The Act is still in its
embryonic stages with full implementation not scheduled until next year.
It represents a dynamic process; one which will be unfolding for the
next several years. It affords numerous and exciting opportunities for
further research. In this regard, many of the questions originally
posed went unanswered. The authors found that in some instances their
questions were unanswerable. In most cases, they were premature, and
the evidence on which to base an answer was simply not yet available.
In the opinion of the authors, further research should be directed in
the following areas
:
1. effects of the new budget process on the defense portion of
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the budget vis-a-vis other major functional categories;
2. study of Congressional decision making patterns to ascertain
any evidence of significant changes; e.g., more rational, fiscal or
programmatic;
3. studies of Budget Committee members, their voting profiles
(pro or anti national security), evolving committee norms, nature of TF
hearings and the geographic mapping of Budget Committee members'
constituency as related to the defense industry;
4. an analysis of the Congressional budget process, its critical
time deadlines and future accommodations required to ensure workable
reforms;
,
5. study of the CBO to ascertain the nature and type of Executive
agency budget information which they eventually deem necessary to
perform their analytical studies;
6. analysis of the efforts to develop the comprehensive
Congressional budget information system and the Government-wide program
structure to discern the impacts of shifting to program-oriented budget
data;
7. an analysis of CBO influence on defense budget alternatives
and issues. What issues do they deem most important and where do they
appear to be getting their guidance regarding development of these issues?
8. an investigation of the realities surrounding Congressional
power shifts, decision rule changes, and new ways of doing business.
* * *
Serving diverse purposes, a budget can be many things: a
political act, a plan of work, a prediction, a source of
enlightenment, a means of obfuscation, a mechanism of control,
an escape from restrictions, a means to action, a brake on
progress, even a prayer that the powers that be will deal





Details of Research Methodology
1. LITERATURE RESEARCH
Initially, the authors undertook a fairly comprehensive survey of
the available, pertinent literature written about Congressional
behavior, decision making, information exchanges, committee interactions,
budget processes and budget reform [Refs. 12, 15, 16, 17, 21, 26, 27,
28, 31, 50 and 73] . These readings served a dual purpose by providing
a basic understanding of Congressional processes and actions and
affording insights into those research techniques and methodologies which
had been employed previously in investigating various aspects of
Congressional behavior. In short order, the research effort was
focused on the more specific issue of Congressional budget reform and
the "dry run test" of the newly enacted Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 conducted during the Fiscal 1976 Federal
budget cycle. (January-November 19 75).
The second phase of the literature research, consequently, con-
centrated on a detailed study of the Senate hearings for improving
Congressional control of the budget [Ref. 66], the legislative history
of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 iRef.
62], and the provisions of the Act itself [Ref. 68]. Additional
background information was obtained through the review of several recent
journal articles on the subject [Refs. 9 and 33-36]. Also, the un-
folding saga of the Fiscal 19 76 budget cycle "dry run test" was followed
closely by reading material in the current issues of Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report
,
National Journal and the local and national
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newspapers. At this juncture, it was concluded that the Act's three
newly created instrumentalities - the Congressional Budget Office, the
House Budget Committee and the Senate Budget Committee - were of
primary interest and importance. It was decided, therefore, to con-
centrate future- research efforts on examining the operation of these
three new organizations and in determining the realities of the Act's
various budget reform measures, particularly as they related to or
impacted upon Department of Defense and Navy budgetary matters.
Since the Act was relatively new and its reforms were untried,
very little written information was available beyond general explana-
tions of the Act's basic legal provisions, organizational and procedural
changes and implementation dates. As could be expected in the
formulative stages of this complex undertaking, very little detailed
knox^ledge regarding the realities of implementing various provisions
of the Act and the internal workings of the three new organizations was
available or chronicled. Since there was so little documented infor-
mation of this nature available, the authors concluded that such
information and insight should be obtained from those individuals
intimately involved and familiar with the Act's implementation. A trip
to Washington. D.C. by the authors was considered necessary not only to
gather additional data, but also to gain first-hand impressions.
2. PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
To establish initial contacts, several telephone calls were made
to the Washington area. Specifically, liaison was established with the
CBO, the Navy Department Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), Naval
Operations Congressional and Policy Coordination Branch (OP-906) and
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the Navy Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations Committee Liaison
(NAVCOMPLIA) . All contacts were fruitful and indicated a willingness
to assist the authors by providing available data and in arranging
additional interviews. In all cases, the contacts indicated that in-
terviews would not be pre-scheduled until the authors were on the scene.
In the meantime, the CBO forwarded some additional background
information which provided more insight into their organization,
staffing and reports. At the request of the CBO contact, a list of
general questions [Appendix AA] was prepared and submitted to convey
some idea as to the nature of the information desired by the authors.
These questions were intended to address functions and responsibilities
assigned by the Act to the CBO and were compiled based upon the authors'
early interpretations of the Act's provisions. Although rather specific
in some instances, the list was to serve as a guide and was not intended
to be comprehensive in its scope.
In preparation for the thesis research trip, the authors continued
their literature search, especially monitoring the current periodicals
and newspapers. The legal provisions of the Act were studied in
greater depth in order to formulate pertinent interview topics and
questions. Knowledge of interviewing skills and techniques was
acquired by readings in several excellent books on the subject [Refs.
3 and 10].
Prior to embarking on the interview phase, it was considered
necessary to expand the sphere of the research effort to include not
only members of the CBO, HBC and SBC, but also members of the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) , the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) , the General Accounting
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Office (GAO), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Department of Navy (DON). In the case
of OSD and DON, the effort would be restricted to appropriate or key
personnel involved either directly in the budget process or in Congress-
ional liaison matters. Also, it was decided to limit Congressional
committee interviews primarily to senior staff members. This procedure
was adhered to with one exception which will be explained in the
following section. This expansion was deemed necessary to permit a
more complete or encompassing view of the new budget process and to
provide a broader cross section of participant's perceptions and
insights.
3. INTERVIEW PHASE
The major input to this thesis came from a ten-day period (2-13
September 1975) of intensive interviews in Washington, D.C. The visit
was timed to coincide with the return of the 94th Congress from their
Summer break and to best accommodate the authors' class schedule.
Congressional budget activity was at a very high level, and the Act
had just undergone one of its first real tests. The SBC, under the
leadership of Chairman Muskie (D-Me) was able to exert enough influence
to have the conference report on the Fiscal 1976 Defense Weapons Pro-
curement Authorization Bill rejected by the Senate on the grounds that
it would inevitably bust the national defense budget target. This
rejection put Senator Muskie and Senator Stennis (D-Miss) , Chairman of
the SASC, on a collision course. While all this activity was interes-
ting, it did create some problems in the obtaining and scheduling of
desired interviews, particularly those with the Congressional committee
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staffs. In many instances, interviews had to be slipped, cancelled
and/or rescheduled. The authors had to be extremely flexible and
quick to take advantage of appointment opportunities as they material-
ized.
As noted earlier, contact points had been established for initial
Washington visits and for arranging further interviews. OLA was
visited first in order to officially introduce the authors and to
establish the purpose of the trip. The first three days were devoted
primarily to interviewing OSD and DON personnel. The last five days
were spent interviewing OMB, GAO, CBO and Congressional committee (HBC,
HASC, SBC and SASC) staff members. Also, a HBC, National Security
Programs Task Force hearing, concerning the matter of defense budget
alternatives, was attended. With the help and guidance of the OLA,
NAVCOMP and CBO contacts, the authors arranged appointments for most of
the other interviews. NAVCOMP was particularly helpful in suggesting
knowledgeable contacts and in arranging meetings with OSD, OMB, HBC
and SBC staff personnel.
In view of time restrictions, OSD and DON interviews were limited
to those people directly involved in the budget process or in Congress-
ional liaison duties. On "Capitol Hill," the investigation, for
the most part, was limited to staff personnel, especially those
specifically involved in analyzing or processing the defense budget.
Senator Nunn (D-Ga) was interviewed because of his unique, position as a
member of both the SBC and the SASC. Thus, interviews conducted were
not randomly generated, but were with people highly qualified and
intimately involved in the new budget process. All persons interviewed
were extremely candid and very interested in discussing their roles and
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thoughts regarding implementation of the Act. Only one of the in-
dividuals contacted did not desire to be interviewed. Thirty-five (35)
people were officially interviewed for a total of approximately fifty-
six (56) hours. Interview durations ranged from fifteen minutes to
several hours, with the average being about one and one-half hours.
Of the total interview time accumulated in this period, a little more
than sixty percent was devoted to the CBO, GAO and Congressional
committee staffs, while a little less than forty percent was devoted
to OSD, DON and OMB.
The interviews were all semi-structured. No formal interview
schedule or questionnaire was utilized. Instead, a standardized list
of questions to be discussed with each type respondent was prepared,
committed to memory and raised in each interview as time would permit.
Certain key questions, for the most part open-ended, were asked of all
interviewees holding similar positions. These questions were designed
to tap personal perceptions and insights. WTien practicable, the
biographical data [Ref. 5] and present position of the respondent
vis-a-vis the budget process would be reviewed prior to the interview.
Also, some questions would be tailored for a particular individual. As
the interviewing proceeded, additional questions were raised based on
information gleaned in earlier conversations. The interviews were kept
flexible in order to allow particular subjects to be broached with those
individuals best prepared to discuss them. More often than not, the
prepared questions served only as a guideline. Many respondents needed
only to hear the authors' introductory remarks, after which they would
discuss the subject openly.

In order to get as much as possible out of each interview, both
authors were present for all sessions and alternated taking notes and
asking questions. This technique enabled each author to follow through
on a specific topic without interruption or hesitation for writing.
Following this- procedure also helped to ensure that the interview did
not stray from the primary issues. The essence of these conversations
were captured immediately; however, any direct, unattributed remarks
or quotations are only approximately verbatim. Note taking might have
lessened the spontaneity of some interviews; however, it did not
visibly disturb any of the respondents.
The use of a portable tape recorder was originally planned;
however, it was quickly learned that the respondents did not desire to
have these conversations recorded. Even though notes were taken, each
interviewee was either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed anonymity.
Although the tape recorder was not employed in actual interviews,
it was used extensively to record the thoughts and impressions of the
authors after each interview session. More often than not, because of
the busy interview schedule, these recapitulations were accomplished in
the evening. This technique served three major purposes. First, it
ensured that the facts were correctly interpreted and completely re-
corded. Secondly, it served as a sounding board for the authors' own
ideas which had been stimulated during a particular interview. Finally,





Study Topics /Questions Submitted to the CBO
1. How should the general format of the President's budget submission
differ from previous year's submissions? (Data elements, program
structure breakdown, etc.)
2. What information and effort will be required of Executive Branch
agencies in preparing the budget submission?
3. Within the initial budget major functional area breakdown, how
will individual programs /program elements be broken out and identified;
i.e., how will this data be further subdivided, displayed and analyzed?
4. In analyzing the budget, what information sources will be utilized?
How will these data sources be validated and organized?
5. What management information systems and analytical techniques will
be employed in analyzing the budget?
6. Will only major programs be analyzed? What other services will
you provide?
7. To what extent and how will ADP be used?
8. How will budget alternatives be developed and evaluated? (Exter-
nally, internally or both?)
9. In considering budget alternatives, how will policy matters
(internal and external) , confidentiality and advocacy problems be dealt
with? Objective analysis or policy from within CBO?
10. How will you ensure that all the correct or viable alternatives
have been presented and considered?
11. To what extent will existing Congressional expertise be employed
in determining alternatives? How will this expertise be tapped?
12. In order to have good defense, a certain amount of intelligence
must be incorporated. How does CBO intend to accomplish this? Will
CBO have access to JSOP throughout the entire budget process?
13. What interface will CBO have with NSC?
14. Prior to formal submission, does the CBO intend to become directly
involved in the DOD budget preparation and review process? If so, at
what stage and at what levels?
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15. What specific communication channels (formal and informal) will
be utilized in processing the DOD budget submission? When will these
channels be used and by whom?
16. What criteria will be utilized to judge the utility and accuracy
of financial and budgetary information received from Executive Depart-
ment agencies?
17. Using this criteria, how would you rate the utility of this
information presently being received for your needs?
18. What will be your informational outputs? (Form, type, distribu-
tion, frequency, etc.).
19. What wilJ. be the CBO's relationship with the House and Senate
Budget Committees and their staffs?
20. What do you foresee as your new role or position vis-a-vis the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees?
21. What will be the relationships between the House and Senate Budget
Committees and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees?
22. What are the CBO staff's capabilities and limitations? What
unique qualities does it possess?
23. Do you envision being hampered by the present budget process




House Budget Committee Members
Members Other Committees
Brock Adams (D-Wash) , Chairman
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D-Mass)
Jim Wright (D-Tex)
Thomas L. Ashley (D-Ohio)
Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn)
Neal Smith (D-Iowa)
James G. O'Hara (D-Mich)
Robert L. Leggett (D-Calif)
Parren J. Mitchell (D-Md)
Omar Burleson (D-Tex)
Sam Gibbons (D-Fla)
Phil M. Landrum (D-Ga)





Interstate & For. Commerce
Majority Leader
Govt. Ops/PW














Delbert L. Latta (R-Ohio)
Elford A, Cederberg (R-Mich)
Herman T. Schneebeli (R-Pa)
James T. Broyhill (R-NC)
Del Clawson (R-Calif)
James F. Hastings (R-NY)
Garner E. Shriver (R-Kan)




Interstate & For. Commerce
Rules






Senate Budget Committee Members
Members Other Committees
Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me) , Chairman
Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash)
Frank E. Moss (D-Utah)
Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn)


















J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R-Md)
James L. Buckley (R-NY)
James A. McClure (R-Idaho)

















*e% V - Do„enici
Defense James A. H^,Jr -
Ernest Holllngs .Warren G. Ma»r' Chai™an
Lawt°n Chiles
Tax Poj, ?°bert D°leA r OJ.J.CV an^ m_ JaiDfto T
Expend!
t
cy and Tax m^ L. Buckley
!f
alter Mondale rh •
J^s Abourezk
• &h £,*<». Jr .
**t^enS1 ' ^
Lawton Chiles pi, .
Salter P T ,
gnus°n
Sa* NuJ * **^
t'






























Barber B. Conable, Jr.





















































* Assistant/not full time




Budget Functional Classification Codes and Titles
050 NATIONAL DEFENSE
150 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS





400 COMMERCE AND TRANSPOR-
TATION
450 COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
500 EDUCATION, MANPOWER AND
SOCIAL SERVICES
550 HEALTH
This function includes those programs
directly related to the common
defense and security of the US .
This function is concerned with the
establishment and maintenance of
peaceful relations, commerce, travel,
and development between the US and
the rest of the world.
The purpose of this function is to
show all science and research activ-
ities of the Federal Government where
the goal is man's general advancement
of knowledge.
This function includes those programs
whose primary purpose is to develop,
manage, and maintain the Nation's
natural resources and environment or
to promote the conservation and
development of energy resources.
This function includes those programs
that promote the economic stability
of agriculture and the capability to
maintain and increase agricultural
production.
This function includes the promotion
and regulation of commerce and trans-
portation.
This function consists of broad-based
community and regional development
programs and programs concerned with
urban and rural renewal.
This function includes those outlays
designed to promote the general ex-
tension of knowledge and skills and/
or to assist individuals to become
self-supporting members of society.
This function involves those programs
that have as their basic purpose the
promotion of the physical and mental
health of the Nation's population, in-





700 VETERANS BENEFITS AND
SERVICES
750 LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUSTICE
800 GENERAL GOVERNMENT





This function includes payments to
persons for which no current service
is rendered.
This function consists of programs
providing benefits and services, the
eligibility for which is related to
military service but which are not
an integral part of national defense.
This function includes those programs
designed to provide judicial services,
police protection, law enforcement:
including civil rights, rehabilitation
and incarceration of criminals, and
promotion of the general maintenance
of domestic order.
This function includes the general
overhead costs of the Federal Gov-
ernment including legislative and
executive activities; provision of
central fiscal, personnel, and prop-
erty activities; and the provision
of services that cannot reasonably be
classified in any other major function,
This function includes Federal aid to
State, local, and territorial gov-
ernments that is available for general
fiscal support or is available for
distribution among programs involving
two or more major budgetary functions
when the distribution among those
functions is at the discretion of the
recipient jurisdiction.
This function includes interest on the
public debt, on uninvested funds, on
tax refunds, and interest recorded in
budgetary receipt (proprietary or
intragovernmental) accounts (except
for interfund interest received by
trust funds)
.
Three groups of offsetting receipts
are:
-employer share, employee retirement
(including both interfund transac-
tions and receipts from off-budget
Federal agencies)
;
-interest received by trust funds
(composed exclusively of trust inter-
fund interest deposited into receipt
accounts) ; and
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